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Harassing Women with Power:
The Case for Including Contra-power Harassment within Title VII
Ann Carey Juliano*
For DeAngelis, the price of success as the police
department’s first woman sergeant included transitory
ribbing by [an anonymous harasser].1
A subordinate propositions his store manager for sex and grabs her breasts.2 A female
production supervisor is threatened by electricians she supervises.3 A female supervisor is called
a bitch and a whore and has a paperweight thrown at her.4
In each of these instances, and in many others, the person subject to the harassment is a
supervisor – a woman (generally) who, at least formally, possesses power over those who are
harassing her. Traditionally, sexual harassment was considered an abuse of power in the
workplace. If this is true, how can female supervisors be harassed? Or are they harassed, but not
within the meaning of employment discrimination law? Is such behavior simply the “price of
success”? In this article, I examine the phenomenon of subordinates harassing supervisors and
argue that the law must consider different concepts of power so that these claims fall within the
protection of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.5
As hard as it is to believe, in the early days after the enactment of Title VII, what would
now be considered the most obvious case of harassment - a supervisor demanding sexual favors
from a subordinate - did not violate the prohibition on discrimination “because of sex.” Rather,
courts brushed aside such claims as simply difficult interpersonal relationships between
supervisors and employees. When advocates for women in the workplace first began to bring
claims of sexual harassment, they had to articulate why sexual harassment is “discrimination
because of sex” such that the employer should be liable. Advocates struggled hard to show that
sexual harassment is not about sex but rather about the misuse of power in the workplace.
Supervisors were misusing their power in order to extract sexual behavior from women. Courts
eventually accepted these claims as cognizable under Title VII.6
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These early sexual harassment claims were known as quid pro quo claims - where a
supervisor demanded sexual favors in exchange for the award of or retention of tangible job
benefits. However, women subject to environments filled with sexual innuendo, sexualized
physical contact and sexist comments were left without a remedy. Once again, advocates sought
to explain why such behavior, even in the absence of tangible employment actions, constituted
discrimination because of sex.
Originally recognized in a race discrimination claim, courts eventually held that “hostile
environments” based on sex violated Title VII.7 Under Title VII, behavior that alters the “terms
or conditions” of employment “because of sex” is prohibited.8 Further, courts accepted that an
employer may be liable under Title VII when this hostile environment is created by co-workers.9
In such a situation, the employer is liable not due to the occurrence of the harassment but due to
the employer’s lack of response to the hostile environment.10 These hostile environment claims
sought to address the norms of the workplace which operate to exclude and ostracize women.11
More recently, the rise of complaints brought wherein the harasser and the victim are of
the same sex (known as same-sex harassment) engendered much discussion in the literature as to
why same-sex harassment should be covered by Title VII. How can harassment by a man
against another man be discrimination “because of sex?”
The circuit courts were split until the Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Justice
Scalia, held that Title VII does cover same-sex harassment.12 He emphasized that a plaintiff
must prove that the behavior occurred “because of” the sex of the victim.13 In emphasizing the
plain language of the statute, the Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Refining Services, Inc. decision
allowed same-sex harassment claims for hostile environments created by both supervisors and
co-workers.14 It may seem that the Court has allowed claims based on every possible
permutation to be actionable under Title VII.15
7

See Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1972) (interpreting §703(a)(1) of Title VII liberally so as to
prohibit existence of pervasive discrimination in work environments, presence of which leads to complete
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VII).
8
Although Title VII does not expressly prohibit sexual harassment, the Supreme Court has held that such behavior
is discrimination on the basis of sex with respect to the terms, conditions or privileges of employment and therefore
violates Title VII. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64.
9
See, e.g., Williams v. Gen. Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553 (6th Cir. 1999); Andrews v. Phila., 895 F.2d 1469 (3d Cir.
1990); Barrett v. Omaha Nat’l Bank, 726 F.2d 424 (8th Cir. 1984); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1983).
10
See Williams, 187 F.3d at 561; Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1486; Barrett, 726 F.2d at 427; Katz, 709 F.2d at 255.
11
See Kathyrn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Gender Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV.
1183, 1198-1202 (1989).
12
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Ref. Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998).
13
Id. at 80. For a further discussion of the “because of sex” requirement, see infra Part IVC.
14
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15
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Bernstein, Sex Discrimination Laws Versus Civil Liberties, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 133, 136-48 (1999); Michael S.
Greve, Sexual Harassment: Telling the Other Victims’ Story, 23 N. KY. L. REV. 523, 529-41 (1993); Mark
McLaughlin Hager, Harassment As a Tort: Why Title VII Hostile Environment Liability Should Be Curtailed, 30
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See Theresa M. Beiner, The Misuse of Summary Judgment in Hostile Environment Cases, 34 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 71, 119-33 (1999); Joanna L. Grossman, The First Bite is Free: Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment, 61
U. PITT. L. REV. 671, 719-35 (2000); Judith J. Johnson, License to Harass Women: Requiring Hostile Environment
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However, there is one remaining fact pattern that has not been addressed by the Court.
This scenario encompasses a set of circumstances outside of the norm, much like the same-sex
harassment cases. It involves the harassment of supervisors by subordinates and has been termed
“contra-power” harassment.16 Social science research shows that contra-power harassment is a
problem,17 but such fact patterns rarely reach the courts.18 Similarly, legal academia has not
considered the issue in any depth.19
In this article, I examine the judiciary’s treatment of contra-power harassment cases and
whether contra-power harassment should be an actionable claim under Title VII. Determining
whether contra-power harassment should be a cognizable claim requires considering the
underlying theory as to why sexual harassment is a violation of Title VII. If sexual harassment
is, as feminist legal theorists have argued, an abuse of power to keep women in their traditional
roles as passive, sexual beings, why should contra-power harassment be actionable? When
women have organizational power, how can they be harassed and why should the law protect
them if they do not protect themselves? The answers to these questions necessitate the
consideration of differing conceptions of power and the expectations for the exercise of such
power.20 Accepting contra-power harassment as an actionable claim requires courts to conceive
of “power” in a different manner than a hierarchical/organizational power.
I argue in this article that courts should conceive of power in a sociocultural manner and
accept contra-power harassment claims. Considering claims of contra-power harassment is the
next step in securing workplace equality for women. Women who reach management status
leave in higher percentages than men who are managers.21 Women find that after they fight their
way to the top (or close to the top or even the middle), the fight continues. That is, women still
face behavior designed to remind them that they are unwelcome in workplaces. In fact, most

Sexual Harassment To Be “Severe or Pervasive” Discriminates Among “Terms and Conditions” of Employment, 62
MD. L. REV. 85, 134-42 (2003); Vivien Toomey Montz, Shifting Parameters: An Examination of Recent Changes
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L. 809, 832-36 (2002).
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Moore, Perceptions of Sexual Harassment in Organizational Settings: The Case of Subordinate-Initiated Harassment
(1995) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University) (on file with author), or “bottom-up harassment,” see
Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1767 n.444 (1998). Contra-power
harassment appears to be the accepted term in social science research. See, e.g., Elizabeth Grauerholz, Sexual
Harassment of Women Professors by Students: Exploring the Dynamics of Power, Authority, and Gender in a
University Setting, 21 SEX ROLES 789 (1989); Jim Matchen & Eros DeSouza, The Sexual Harassment of Faculty
Members by Students, 42 SEX ROLES 295 (2000); Kathleen McKinney, Sexual Harassment of University Faculty by
Colleagues and Students, 23 SEX ROLES 421 (1990); Kathleen M. Rospenda, Judith A. Richman & Stephanie J.
Nawyn, Doing Power: The Confluence of Gender, Race, and Class in Contra-power Sexual Harassment, 12
GENDER & SOC’Y 40 (1998); Margaret Schneider & Susan P. Phillips, A Qualitative Study of Sexual Harassment of
Female Doctors by Patients, 45 SOC. SCI. MED. 669 (1997); Julie Holliday Wayne, Disentangling the Power Bases
of Sexual Harassment: Comparing Gender, Age and Position Power, 57 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 301 (2000).
17
See infra Part IA.
18
See infra Part III.
19
For a further discussion of the limited extent to which legal scholars have addressed contra-power harassment, see
infra note 110 and accompanying text.
20
For a discussion of the different conceptions of power and a comparative assessment of each, see infra Part IIA.
21
See Hazel M. Rosin & Karen Korabik, Workplace Variables, Affective Responses, and Intention to Leave Among
Women Managers, 64 J. OCCUPATIONAL PSYCHOL. 317, 317, 327-28 (1991).
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women plateau at the middle management level.22 These middle managers must negotiate the
roles of supervisor, subordinate and woman in the workplace. The women in lower organization
levels of the work force need female managers and supervisors as role models.23 To deny Title
VII protection to contra-power claims is to cede victory to the unequal workplace. Further, to
the extent that contra-power cases are “novel,” these cases provide an opportunity to examine the
common assumptions underlying sexual harassment law.23a
A contra-power harassment claim is limited to a hostile environment claim in that
subordinates do not have the power to grant or deny tangible employment benefits.24 Two of the
elements of a hostile environment claim require special consideration. First, a plaintiff must
prove that the behavior at issue is sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to affect a term,
condition, or privilege of employment.25 An analysis of the case law shows that courts are
downplaying the severity of behavior when the victim of the harassment is a supervisor.26 I
argue that courts should not consider the organizational relationship of the target and the harasser
when deciding if the workplace has been rendered hostile.27 By doing so, the courts are ignoring
the importance of sociocultural power which allows lower-status men to harass women at
work.27a By exercising their societal power, men are able to harass their supervisors and to affect
the terms or conditions of women’s employment.
However, the organizational relationship is important for determining employer liability.
The standard to hold the employer liable for harassment by its employees turns on the
organizational status of the harasser and the employer’s response to the harassment. Briefly, an
employer is vicariously liable for a hostile environment created by a supervisor but maintains the
ability to prove an affirmative defense.28 If co-workers have created the hostile environment, the
22
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23a
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49, 71 (2006) (discussing “novel” fact patterns, including contra-power, in racial harassment cases).
24
The five elements of a hostile environment claim have generally been accepted as: (1) the employee belongs to a
protected group; (2) the employee was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) the harassment complained of
was based upon sex; (4) the harassment complained of affected a "term, condition, or privilege" of employment; and
(5) respondeat superior: the employer knew or should have known of the harassment in question and failed to take
prompt remedial action. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903-05 (11th Cir. 1982). See also EEOC
Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (2006).
25
Henson, 682 F.2d at 904.
26
See infra notes 203-216 and accompanying text (discussing cases where courts recognized presence of sexually
explicit behavior or comments, yet determined conduct was not sufficiently severe or pervasive).
27
For a further discussion of the organization power model proposed by social science researchers to explain sexual
harassment and its inadequacies, see infra notes 85-93 and accompanying text.
27a
Other commentators have called upon the courts to consider the informal power dynamics of the workplace.
Susan Carle’s recent piece argues that courts have argued these informal power dynamics to classify more harassers
as co-workers than should be rightly so considered. See Susan D. Carle, Acknowledging Informal Power Dynamics
in the Workplace: A Proposal for Further Development of the Vicarious Liability Doctrine in Hostile Environment
Sexual Harassment Cases, 13 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 85 (Spring 2006).
28
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc., v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765
(1998). See infra Part V for an in-depth discussion of the employer liability standard.
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employer is liable under a negligence standard, i.e., the employer is liable for failure to take
prompt remedial action to correct that behavior of which it has knowledge.29 I argue that a
negligence standard is the appropriate standard for contra-power harassment claims. In applying
this standard, courts should not presume that women who have risen to the rank of supervisors
are incapable of choosing to exercise their power simply by virtue of their status as women.
However, courts should not require the supervisor-target to exercise discipline preemptively.
Other targets of sexual harassment are not required to engage in self-help remedies. In other
cases of sexual harassment, a complaint of sexual harassment puts the employer on notice.
There is no compelling reason to create a different rule here. Supervisors should be penalized
for failing to exercise power only when the employer explicitly authorizes the exercise of such
power.
This article proceeds accordingly. In Part I, I describe the social science research into
contra-power harassment. Part IA discusses the prevalence of contra-power harassment, Part IB
describes the behaviors which make up contra-power harassment, and Part IC sets forth the
responses by victims of sexual harassment, both traditional and contra-power. With the
empirical evidence in place, I then turn to the theoretical constructs of contra-power harassment.
In Part IIA, I set forth the four models of power that give rise to sexual harassment:
organizational; social-cultural; sex-role spillover and natural/biological. In Part IIB, I review the
legal scholarship defining harassment as discrimination “because of sex.” Part III describes
contra-power harassment cases that have reached the courts.
Next, I discuss the creation of the contra-power harassment claim. Part IV deals with the
first four elements of a contra-power harassment claim. Part IVA addresses “protected class.”
Part IVB deals with the unwelcome requirement. Part IVC takes on the “because of sex”
requirement. Part IVD addresses the severe or pervasive requirement. Part V addresses the
difficult question of employer liability. Each part considers the courts’ current holdings on these
elements and makes suggested changes. A brief conclusion follows.
I.

The Social Science of Contra-power Harassment

In the social science arena, Katherine Benson is generally credited with coining the term
“contra-power harassment.”30 Responding to an article describing university definitions of
sexual harassment, Benson criticized definitions that refused to label behavior as harassing
unless the victim had less formal power than the abuser.31 She discussed contra-power
harassment as occurring when the victim has formal power over the abuser.32 She argued that
the power relation that is essential to sexual harassment is not the formal, organizational power
relationship but rather the relation that exists between men and women in society.33 In doing so,
she set into motion a multitude of social science research studies.
A. The Prevalence of Contra-power Harassment

29

Faragher, 524 U.S. at 799; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 759.
See Katherine A. Benson, Comment on Crocker’s “An Analysis of University Definitions of Sexual Harassment,”
9 SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE & SOC’Y 516, 517 (1984).
31
Id. at 519.
32
Id. at 517.
33
Id. at 518.
30
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It has become common knowledge that sexual harassment is a widespread problem. The
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) receives more than 13,000 formal
complaints each year.34 The number of formal charges is up five-fold from the late 1980s.35
One study of federal employees found 44% of women and 19% of men experienced harassing
behavior in the previous two years.36 The National Association for Female Executives found
that 53% of its membership was sexually harassed or knew someone who was.37 Over 60% of
Working Woman’s magazine readers reported having been sexually harassed at work and more
than one third of those readers knew a co-worker who was harassed.38
The least common form of harassment reported is contra-power harassment. According
to the U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board, 10-16% of men and 2-4% of women who report
being harassed report being harassed by subordinates.39 Another study reported that women
experienced harassment from subordinates in 8% of the harassment incidents.40 It bears noting
that one explanation for the low number of reported incidences of contra-power harassment of
women is that women do not occupy supervisory positions in the same magnitude as men.
According to a recent report by the EEOC, women represent 48% of the workforce but represent
only 36% of officials and managers.41 In addition, women are more likely than men to have an
opposite-sex supervisor.42 Further, women with higher education levels are the most vulnerable
to contra-power harassment, in part because more men comprise their subordinates, but also
because “their gender was also likely to be particularly salient under such circumstances.”43
Despite low reporting rates, contra-power harassment is prevalent across professions and
job categories. One female executive noted that “the higher up you climb, the worse the
harassment gets.”44 In one study, 77% of female family physicians reported having been
sexually harassed by patients.45 Three studies indicated that between 34% and 39% of all female

34

EEOC, Sexual Harassment Charges, http://eeoc.gov/stats/harass.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2006).
See Bell et al., supra note 23, at 67; McKinney, supra note 16, at 424.
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U.S. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD. (USMSPB), REPORT ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE:
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note 36, at 19.
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subordinate (8%). Further, men were most often harassed by co-workers (56%) followed by subordinate (31%) and
least often by someone at higher level (14%)). A study of racial harassment cases found contra-power cases to
account for 3.1% of the cases studied. See Chew and Kelley, supra note 23a, at 72.
41
EEOC, Glass Ceilings: The Status of Women as Officials and Managers in the Private Sector,
http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/reports/glassceiling/index.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2006). See also Bell et al., supra note
6, at 65 (women occupy only 30% of all salaried manager positions, 20% of middle manager positions and about 5%
of executive level positions); Barbara A. Gutek & Bruce Morasch, Sex-Ratios, Sex-Role Spillover, and Sexual
Harassment of Women at Work, 38 J. SOC. ISSUES 55, 57 (1982) (41% of women in study reported that they
supervised others as compared to 61% of men).
42
Gutek & Morasch, supra note 41, at 57.
43
Colleen O’Connell & Karen Korabik, Sexual Harassment: The Relationship of Personal Vulnerability, Work
Context, Perpetrator Status, and Type of Harassment to Outcomes, 56 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 299, 320 (2000).
44
Bell et al., supra note 23, at 70.
45
Schneider & Phillips, supra note 16, at 669.
35
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attorneys reported being sexually harassed by a client in the last five years.46 A study of
academia found that 30% of male faculty and 24% of female faculty were targets of uninvited
sexual comments from students as often as four times per month.47 Another study of workplace
aggression found that 20% of the “institigators” of bullying are of lower institutional status than
the targets.47a
As with other forms of harassment, contra-power harassment is most likely to occur when
the employer has created a workplace in which the harassers feel free to harass. Two of the
strongest risk factors for harassment are an unprofessional atmosphere and the existence of sexist
attitudes.48
B. Behaviors
So what type of behavior constitutes contra-power harassment? The most common forms
of contra-power harassment, according to one study, are unwanted sexual teasing, jokes, remarks
or questions.49 One study of female physicians revealed that 77% of female doctors have been
harassed by a patient, 26% reported feeling frightened by the sexual behavior of their male
patients,50 and they commonly experienced sexist comments and sexualized interactions.51 In
addition, female physicians are groped, asked to do unnecessary genital exams, sent sex-related
letters and objects, and some are assaulted.52
In the academic setting, female professors reported experiencing undue attention, verbal
sexist comments, written sexual comments, physical advances, explicit sexual propositions,
sexual bribery, sexual assault and obscene phone calls.53 In addition, students possess some
power in that they evaluate faculty. The evaluations are anonymous, creating the perfect vehicle
for a harasser to undermine a professor, possibly affecting her career, with comments about her
body and sexuality without facing consequences.54 Students may draw explicit pictures or write
comments on the evaluation that could be considered sexually harassing.55

46

Frank Clancy, When Customer Service Crosses the Line, WORKING WOMAN, Dec. 1994, at 36, 38.
There is an interesting question here as to whether harassment by a client should be considered contra-power
harassment. Although the general perception may be that the attorney is able to “fire” the client and thus holds the
power, in many situations the client may hold the greater power. Imagine the situation of a newly hired female
associate and the long-established client of a firm, or the solo practitioner trying to establish her practice. In some
instances the label of contra-power harassment will not fit the facts of harassment from clients.
47
Matchen & DeSouza, supra note 16, at 297; McKinney, supra note 16, at 425.
47a
David C. Yamada, The Phenomenon of “Workplace Bullying” and the Need for Status-Blind Hostile
Environment Protection, 88 GEORGETOWN L. J. 475, 481 (March 2000) (citing Christine M. Pearson, Incivility and
Aggression at Work: Executive Summary (July 1998) (on file with David Yamada).
48
Elizabeth O’Hare & William O’Donohue, Sexual Harassment: Identifying Risk Factors, 27 ARCHIVES SEXUAL
BEHAV. 561, 576 (1998).
49
Sandra S. Tangri, Martha R. Burt & Leanor B. Johnson, Sexual Harassment at Work: Three Explanatory Models,
38 J. SOC. ISSUES 33, 46 (1982). This is true regardless of the sex of the victim or the status of the harasser. See
also USMSPB, supra note 36, at 14 (noting most commonly reported form of sexual harassment is “unwanted
sexual teasing, jokes, remarks or questions”).
50
Susan P. Phillips & Margaret Schneider, Sexual Harassment of Female Doctors by Patients, 329 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1936 (1993).
51
Schneider & Phillips, supra note 16, at 670.
52
Id.
53
Grauerholz, supra note 16, at 793.
54
Id. at 790.
55
Id.
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Women faculty can be harassed in subtler or more indirect ways that may “punish” the
instructor for acting outside of her traditional gender role.56 Students spread rumors, intimidate
women professors, and make sexist or sexual comments, physical advances and obscene phone
calls that request sex or mention the professor’s sexual attractiveness.57 Typically, the harasser is
a male student.58 This type of sexual harassment is rarely reported and is frequently attributed to
ignorance, stupidity or awkwardness, which allows students to get by with direct and obvious
behaviors.59
C. Responses to Contra-power Harassment
Sexual harassment has a wide variety of impacts on the workplace and the individuals
involved. In addition to the emotional effects of sexual harassment, women find that their
careers are interrupted.60 “Women may . . . experience lower productivity, less job satisfaction,
reduced self-confidence, and a loss of motivation and commitment to their work and their
employer.”61
Despite the prevalence of sexual harassment, most victims of sexual harassment do not
formally report the harassment.62 Only 26% of the Working Woman readers who admitted being
harassed formally reported it.63 Social scientists believe victims do not report what happened to
them because they fear repercussions, are embarrassed to report the incident, feel shameful about
what happened, or do not believe that what they experienced qualifies as sexual harassment.64
Instead, common responses to sexual harassment are to ignore the behavior or to engage in
denial.65 In addition, many women will quit rather than face the harassment.66 Although sexual
harassment has received increased attention, report rates appear to remain low. Initial
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Id. at 799. See also Jeanette N. Cleveland & Melinda E. Kerst, Sexual Harassment and Perceptions of Power: An
Under-Articulated Relationship, 42 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 49, 58 (1993) (“The goal of the abuser in contra-power
harassment is often to devalue the woman by highlighting the traditional gender stereotype (i.e., helplessness,
incompetence, passivity) over her work role.”); Kathleen McKinney, supra note 16, at 423 (“[I]t is argued . . . that
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57
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59
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60
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56 (Linda LeMoncheck & James P. Sterba eds., 2001).
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Louise F. Fitzgerald, Suzanne Swan & Karla Fischer, Why Didn’t She Just Report Him? The Psychological and
Legal Implications of Women’s Responses to Sexual Harassment, 51 J. SOCIAL ISSUES 117, 121 (1995).
63
Sandroff, supra note 38, at 47.
64
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College Faculty, 67 J. HIGHER EDUC. 149, 150 (1996); Fitzgerald et al., supra note 62, at 122 (noting that most
common reason for non-reporting is fear).
65
Cleveland & Kerst, supra note 56, at 59 (“Two of the most common reactions that women have to sexual
harassment are denial and to ignore the incident.”).
66
O’Connell & Korabik, supra note 43, at 304 (citing studies); Barbara A. Gutek, Understanding Sexual
Harassment at Work in SEXUAL HARASSMENT: ISSUES and ANSWERS 50, 56 (LeMoncheck & Sterba eds. 2001)
(“Up to ten percent of women have quit a job because of sexual harassment).
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information suggested that report rates were on the rise in the early to mid-1990s.67 For
example, the National Association of Working Women hotline received triple the usual number
of calls in a week in 199168 and the number of charges filed with the EEOC increased five-fold
from the late 1980s to the mid-1990s.69 However, after this initial jump in EEOC charges, the
rate leveled off and has begun to decline in recent years.70 Moreover, social science studies
continue to find low report rates. A 1995 study of Navy officers and enlisted members found
that only 8% of enlisted women and 6% of women officers filed grievances.71 Even when the
informal practice of reporting behavior to an authority (as opposed to filing a formal grievance)
is considered, fewer than 25% of women who had been harassed reported the behavior.72 More
recent social science studies have attempted to investigate determinants and precursors of
reporting, as well as classify how targets respond to sexual harassment, in order to better
understand why targets do not report sexual harassment.73
As harassing behaviors are not always clearly sexual harassment, some victims may be
hesitant to report the behaviors because they are not sure if what they experienced is indeed
sexual harassment. Men and women interpret behaviors differently.74 In one study, men
believed that women harassed by persons of lower status would be more upset than men harassed
by such persons.75 However, women believed that both men and women would be equally upset.
“[W]omen see harassing behaviors negatively.”76 Although the most commonly experienced
harassing behaviors reported were unwanted sexual teasing, jokes, remarks or questions,77 a
victim may feel as if she is over-reacting if she reports it and may choose to suffer in silence
instead. In some studies, the hierarchical level of the harasser significantly influenced
perceptions of “less severe” forms of harassment such as gender harassment and seductive
behavior but had no impact on perceptions of sexual bribery, coercion or assault.78 In fact, the
higher the organizational status of the harasser, the more likely the target is to acknowledge
being harassed.79 Targets of contra-power harassment, then, would be the least likely to
acknowledge being harassed.
67

See, e.g., Bell et al., supra note 23, at 67; Sandroff, supra note 38, at 49.
Galen, supra note 37, at 31.
69
Bell et al., supra note 23, at 67.
70
EEOC, supra note 34.
71
Carol E. Newell, Paul Rosenfeld & Amy L. Culbertson, Sexual Harassment Experiences and Equal Opportunity
Perceptions of Navy Women, 32 SEX ROLES 159, 161 (1995).
72
Sandy Welsh & James E. Gruber, Not Taking It Any More: Women Who Report or File Complaints of Sexual
Harassment, 36 CANADIAN REV. SOC. & ANTHROPOLOGY 559 (1999) (summarizing studies of report rates).
73
See, e.g., Caren B. Goldberg, The Impact of the Proportion of Women in One’s Workgroup, Profession, and
Friendship Circle on Males’ and Females’ Responses to Sexual Harassment, 45 SEX ROLES 359 (2001); Deborah
Erdos Knapp, Robert H. Faley, Steven E. Ekeberg & Cathy L. Z. Dubois, Determinants of Target Responses to
Sexual Harassment: A Conceptual Framework, 22 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 687 (1997); Amy J. Marin & Rosanna E.
Guadagno, Perceptions of Sexual Harassment Victims as a Function of Labeling and Reporting, 41 SEX ROLES 921
(1999).
74
Grauerholz, supra note 16, at 798 (“Women’s perception and awareness of sexual harassment, even by male
students, also reflect women’s experience in a culture in which coercive sexuality is wide spread.”).
75
Kathleen McKinney, Contrapower Sexual Harassment: The Effects of Student Sex and Type of Behavior of
Faculty Perceptions, 27 SEX ROLES 627, 640 (1992).
76
Bell et al., supra note 23, at 70.
77
USMSPB, supra note 36, at 14.
78
Moore, supra note 16, at 18-19.
79
Theresa M. Beiner, GENDER MYTHS V. WORKING REALITIES: USING SOCIAL SCIENCE TO REFORMULATE SEXUAL
HARASSMENT LAW 161 (2005).
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The dynamics of contra-power harassment make the fears associated with reporting the
incidents different from sexual harassment initiated by a supervisor or co-worker. Supervisors
face different repercussions than subordinates in reporting sexual harassment. Supervisors’
ability to successfully manage their subordinates may be called into question.80 Some female
supervisors have suggested, in conversations with their colleagues, they do not want to be
perceived as a bitch and want to be considered “one of the guys.”81 For male supervisors,
reporting sexual harassment carries the added disincentives of fear of public exposure and
perceived weakness as a superior or as a man, and the threat of being perceived as, or accused of,
being the initiator of the harassment.82
II.

Background of Contra-power

A. Models of Power
Sexual harassment is traditionally defined as an abuse of power made possible by the
power inequalities between men and women.83 In the workplace, men historically have power
over women by a result of their higher organizational positions and, thus, are able to abuse that
power to harass women. This traditional definition does not account for harassment by coworkers or for contra-power harassment. To understand how and why contra-power harassment
occurs, it is useful to explain the various models of power proposed by social science
researchers.84
The first model is the organizational power model.85 Many researchers suggest that the
legal system’s definition of sexual harassment is premised upon this model.86 Under this model,
harassment is most likely to occur when the harasser has a higher place in the workplace
hierarchy than the victim.87 “[S]exual harassment is the result of certain opportunity structures

80

Moore, supra note 16, at 7, 42 (stating that superiors may be hesitant to sanction behavior because “the use of
formal sanctions to bring about cooperation is perceived as poor leadership”). See also infra Part VD(1) (suggesting
that female supervisor’s hesitancy in reporting contra-power harassment stems from desire to maintain appearance
of effective managerial control).
81
Martin, supra note 22, at 158.
82
Moore, supra note 16, at 42-43.
83
See Susanne Baer, Dignity or Equality? Responses to Workplace Harassment in European, German, and U.S.
Law, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 582, 590 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds.,
2004); Gutek & Morasch, supra note 41, at 56.
84
Social science has not come to a consensus on the number of models used to explain sexual harassment. See, e.g.,
Tangri et al., supra note 49, at 34 (describing three “broad models” as natural or biological, organizational, and
sociocultural); Greetje Timmerman, Sexual Harassment of Adolescents Perpetrated by Teachers and by Peers: An
Exploration of the Dynamics of Power, Culture, and Gender in Secondary Schools, 48 SEX ROLES 231, 232 (2003)
(discussing harassment in secondary schools and describing “a number of theories”); Gary L. Whaley & Shirley H.
Tucker, A Theoretical Integration of Sexual Harassment Models, 17 EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES INT’L 21, 21-22 (1998)
(describing four models: sociocultural, organizational, individual differences, and nature/biology). For a more indepth account of the social science behind these various models, see Beiner, supra note 79, 114-125 (describing four
models).
85
See Cleveland & Kerst, supra note 56, at 50-52; Gutek & Morasch, supra note 41, at 56-57; Rospenda et al.,
supra note 16, at 41-44; Tangri et al., supra note 49, at 37-40; Timmerman, supra note 84, at 232-33; Wayne, supra
note 16, at 303-10; Whaley & Tucker, supra note 84, at 21.
86
See, e.g., Rospenda et al., supra note 16, at 41.
87
Wayne, supra note 16, at 302.
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created by organizational climate, hierarchy, and specific authority relations.”88 Under the
organizational model, women may harass men who are lower on the flowchart.89 Some research
has provided a more nuanced view of the organizational power model by examining certain
structural aspects of the workplace.90 For example, the ratio of men to women in the workplace,
as well as the hierarchical positions of men, is a relevant factor to determine whether harassment
will occur.91 Regardless of what nuances are added to the model, it is dependent upon the
concept of organizational hierarchy.92 Thus, this model cannot account for the widespread
occurrences of co-worker harassment or for contra-power harassment. In my review of the
social science literature, I found few researchers who supported the organizational model.93
A second model is the sociocultural model. This model explains sexual harassment as
the result of “societal norms or cultural patterns that promote superiority of some groups (e.g., . .
. males) over other groups (e.g., . . . women).”94 The patriarchal system privileges men and
provides them with the power to harass women in the workplace.95 Thus, sexual harassment is
more likely to occur when someone has societal power over another person and “reflects the
larger society’s differential distribution of power and status between the sexes.”96 This model
explains any type of harassment in which men harass women including co-worker and contrapower but fails to explain women harassing men.97
A third model integrates the previous models. The sex-role spillover model explains
sexual harassment as the result of sex roles being asserted over work roles.98 In addition, another
set of social science researchers added a consideration of interpersonal power to the sociocultural
power and organizational power. By doing this, they attempt to address the importance of
sources of power within the workplace that derive from sources other than hierarchical position,
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Tangri et al., supra note 49, at 34.
However, under the organizational model, men are still the more likely harassers because of the positions they
hold: in one study, 41% of women supervised others as opposed to 61% of men; moreover 43% of women had an
opposite-sex supervisor whereas 7% of men had an opposite-sex supervisor. Gutek & Morasch, supra note 41, at
56.
90
See Tangri et al., supra note 49, at 43-49; Wayne, supra note 16, at 303-10.
91
Tangri et al., supra note 49, at 37. The difference in hierarchical positions is one factor leading to harassment.
Research has also examined the sex ratio of the workplace, the sex ratio of the occupation, occupational norms, job
function and availability of grievance procedures and job alternatives. See Rospenda et al., supra note 16, at 42
(collecting studies).
92
Rospenda et al., supra note 16, at 43 (“Organizational models underestimate the importance of gender and other
social characteristics in structuring access to organizational power.”).
93
See, e.g., Gutek & Morasch, supra note 41, at 57 (“[O]ur data does not provide much support for [this]
perspective.”); Rospenda et al., supra note 16, at 43 (stating that organizational models assume that organizations
are gender neutral and “underestimate the importance of gender . . . in structuring access to [] power.”).
94
Wayne, supra note 16, at 303. The sociocultural model is also called the societal power model. See Cleveland &
Kerst, supra note 56, at 50.
95
Tangri et al., supra note 49, at 40.
96
Id. at 34. See also Rospenda et al., supra note 16, at 41 (“[S]exual harassment emanates from power differences
between men and women at the sociocultural level and functions to maintain those differences at the organizational
level.”).
97
Rospenda et al. suggest that the sociocultural model is limited in its ability to account for female-on-male
harassment as well as same-sex harassment. These non-traditional forms of harassment are not explained under this
theory because the model does not account for the confluence of gender, race and class. However, it may explain
same-sex harassment to the extent that the victim of the harassment is someone perceived to have less social power,
such as a gay or lesbian employee. See Rospenda et al., supra note 16, at 43-44.
98
See Gutek & Morasch, supra note 41, at 58.
89
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such as access to resources.99 This model specifically addresses contra-power harassment and
argues that male subordinates harass women supervisors to counteract or equalize power
differentials with women supervisors.100 Thus, acts of contra-power harassment reinforce the
inferior gender status of women by negating their higher organizational status.101 Deborah
Tannen has described contra-power harassment as a “frequent form of insubordination
perpetrated against those above them in a hierarchy.”101a
The final model is the natural/biological model which explains sexual harassment as a
natural outcome of the difference in sexual drives between men and women.102 Termed
“somewhat simplistic” by one social science article,103 this model asserts that sexual harassment
is a “natural expression of sexual attraction and that men and women are naturally attracted to
each other.”104 Further, this model rests on the inner drive of men to be sexually aggressive and
therefore places no blame or bad intent on the harasser.105 Men are simply seeking to maximize
reproductive sex.106 This model, of course, does not explain women harassing men (unless the
women are seeking the security of male economic support for their offspring) and does not
explain same-sex harassment.107
Of the four models described, two - the sociocultural and the integrated models - provide
an excellent account for the occurrence of contra-power harassment. Women with power may be
seen as a threat to men either economically or to their self-esteem.108 The goal of the harasser is
to devalue the higher organizational status of women “by highlighting the traditional gender
stereotype . . . over her work role.”109 It is a tactic to gain power - social power - over female
supervisors. Women who deviate from their ascribed roles by obtaining power are then punished
with harassing behavior.
B. Conceptions of Harassment as Discrimination
If social science provides the theoretical basis of the “why,” “how” and “to whom” of
contra-power harassment, how have legal scholars addressed the issue? The short answer is:
they have not. Apart from a few references acknowledging the existence of contra-power
harassment, it is not discussed in legal literature.110 Despite ignoring contra-power harassment,
99

Cleveland & Kerst, supra note 56, at 52-53.
Id. at 58.
101
Id.
101a
Deborah Tannen, What’s Sex Got to Do With It? In SEXUAL HARASSMENT: ISSUES AND ANSWERS 85, 86
(LeMoncheck & Sterba eds. 2001).
102
Some social science researchers who take great pains to explain the other three models do not mention the
natural/biological model. See, e.g., Cleveland & Kerst, supra note 56, at 50-54; Gutek & Morasch, supra note 41;
Rospenda et al., supra note 16, at 41-44; Wayne, supra note 16, at 303-12.
103
Whaley & Tucker, supra note 84, at 22.
104
Id.
105
This model tends to “trivialise [sic] sexual harassment as normal and harmless and as the result of the behavior of
a few ‘sick’ proclivities of a minority of men.” Id.
106
Beiner, supra note 79, at 122.
107
For a compelling dissection of the support for the natural/biological model, see Beiner, supra note 79, at 121-125.
108
See Whaley & Tucker, supra note 84, at 26.
109
Cleveland & Kerst, supra note 56, at 58.
110
Contra-power harassment is mentioned or discussed in eleven law review articles. Only Vicki Schultz has
discussed the concept in more than passing, and her discussion consists of only a few sentences. See Schultz, supra
note 16, at 1767 & n.444 (“[W]omen higher-ups also confront challenges to their power and efforts to subvert their
performance by male subordinates.”). Professor Schultz discusses contra-power harassment, which she refers to as
“bottom-up harassment,” in the context of her theory to reconceptualize sexual harassment as behavior that seeks to
100
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legal scholars have addressed the question of why sexual harassment should be considered
discrimination because of sex. Although these theories were not designed to encompass contrapower harassment, each supports the argument that Title VII should protect against the
harassment of supervisors by subordinates.
In the late 1990s, the rise of same-sex harassment cases catalyzed scholars to return to the
fundamental question of “what’s wrong with sexual harassment?”111 How can “because of sex”
be interpreted in a principled way so as to prohibit harassment against women while also
protecting men from same-sex harassment?112 A fascinating dialogue developed within legal
undermine women’s competence in the workplace. Id. Her theory would encompass claims of contra-power
harassment. See infra notes 138-148 and accompanying text. Six other articles briefly mention contra-power
harassment in passing. See Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Unwrapping Racial Harassment Law, 27 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 49, 72 (2006) (reviewing findings of empirical study on racial harassment cases and describing
“contra-power harassment” as “novel fact pattern” appearing where “power status of the parties is reversed”); AnnaMaria Marshall, Idle Rights: Employees’ Rights Consciousness and the Construction of Sexual Harassment Policies,
39 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 83, 102-03 (2005) (noting that one common management practice which creates obstacles for
women seeking protection under grievance procedures is interpretation of procedures to exempt certain categories of
harassment, with one such category being “same-sex contra-power harassment”); Ramona L. Paetzold & Rafael
Gely, Through the Looking Glass: Can Title VII Help Women and Minorities Shatter the Glass Ceiling?, 31 HOUS.
L. REV. 1517, 1544 & n.142 (1995) (noting that harassment “may occur at all levels within an organization, so that
women and minorities in managerial level positions may become targets of harassment by superiors and
subordinates alike” and citing social science article identifying such behavior as “contra-power harassment”); Vicki
Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061, 2146 n.349 (2003) (discussing contra-power harassment in
footnote); Rachel L. Toker, Note, Multiple Masculinities: A New Vision for Same-Sex Harassment Law, 34 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 577, 588-89 (1999) (discussing Professor Schultz’s theory of sexual harassment and its
encompassing of contra-power harassment); Rachel Mead Zweighaft, Comment, What’s the Harm? The Legal
Accommodation of Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment, 18 COMP. LAB. L.J. 434, 437 n.12 (1997) (“[F]emale
supervisors sometimes are harassed by men in lower positions. This phenomenon is called ‘contra-power
harassment.’”). The remaining four articles merely cite to a social science article that has the term in the title. See
Theresa M. Beiner, Sex, Science and Social Knowledge: The Implications of Social Science Research on Imputing
Liability to Employers for Sexual Harassment, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 273, 294 n.133 (2001) (citing social
science article with “contra-power” in title for proposition that there is limited research examining “interaction of
sexual harassment with race, ethnicity and socio-economic status”); Tanya Kateri Hernandez, A Critical Race
Feminism Empirical Research Project: Sexual Harassment & the Internal Complaints Black Box, 39 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1235, 1242 n.24 (2006) (citing social science article with “contra-power” in title for proposition concerning
responses to sexual harassment); Tanya Kateri Hernandez, Sexual Harassment and Racial Disparity: The Mutual
Construction of Gender and Race, 4 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 183, 192 n.45 (2001) (citing social science article
with “contra-power” in title for proposition concerning responses to sexual harassment); Richard L. Wiener & Linda
E. Hurt, Social Sexual Conduct at Work: How Do Workers Know When It Is Sexual Harassment and When It Is
Not?, 34 CAL. W. L. REV. 53, 66 n.74 (1997) (citing social science article with “contra-power” in title in string cite
of articles for assertion that men and women workers differ in their views of what behavior constitutes sexual
harassment).
111
See Katherine M. Franke, What’s Wrong With Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691, 691-98 (1997).
Franke argues that because of the increasing severity and doctrinal complexity of the sexual harassment problem, the
time has come to readdress the question of why sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination. Id. at 691.
Franke explains that neither the Supreme Court nor the principal theoretical arguments advanced by feminist
scholars sufficiently answer the question of why workplace sexual harassment justifies a Title VII cause of action
for discrimination “on the basis of sex.” Id. at 693. The three fundamental feminist rationales she rejects are that
sexual harassment is (1) conduct that would not have occurred but for the plaintiff’s sex, id. at 705-14; (2) conduct
that violates Title VII specifically because it is sexual in nature, id. at 714-25; and (3) conduct that sexually
subordinates women to men, id. at 725-29.
112
Same-sex harassment disproportionately affects men. See USMSPB, supra note 36. The report’s main
informational source is a survey questionnaire sent in April 1994 to almost 13,200 federal employees, to which over
61% (8000 people) responded voluntarily and anonymously. Id. at 1-2. The study states that from among those
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academia over how to interpret Title VII.113 Each voice in the discussion critiqued the current
approaches utilized by the courts. For example, courts had employed a “but for” test under
which courts sought to determine whether the complained of behavior would have occurred “but
for” the victim’s sex.114 In addition, some courts have focused primarily on the sexualized
nature of the behavior, thereby finding behavior that is not overtly sexual to be irrelevant.115
Theorists agree that sexual harassment causes harm but have approached the wrong of
sexual harassment with different foci. Some theorists wish to keep the focus on harassment
against women at work while bringing claims of same-sex harassment in on the margins.116
Others view the wrong of harassment as equally impacting men and women.117 A summary of
these theories follows and includes a description of how contra-power harassment fits within
each.118
1. Bernstein’s Respectful Person Standard
Anita Bernstein places sexual harassment as a wrong somewhere between a Title VII
violation and a workplace tort.119 She argues that hostile environment sexual harassment is a
type of disrespect.120 A hostile environment plaintiff must prove both that she subjectively
perceived her environment to be hostile and that the environment was objectively hostile or
abusive.121 Bernstein takes issue with the reasonableness test employed by courts to determine
the objective element - whether it is a reasonable person, reasonable woman or any other
formulation.122 She advocates the adoption of the “respectful person” standard because sexual
who had experienced unwanted sexual attention (44% of women and 19% of men responding to the survey), only
1% of female victims said they were sexually harassed by another woman or women, while 21% of male victims
reported being harassed by another man or men. Id. at 18.
113
For a useful summary of this discussion, see Jaimie Leeser, Note, The Causal Role of Sex in Sexual Harassment,
88 CORNELL L. REV. 1750, 1772-78 (2003).
114
See Franke, supra note 111, at 730-47. Franke critiques the “but for” test, contending that “[i]n both the sameand different-sex contexts, this account fails to address why sexual harassment is a kind of sex discrimination.” Id.
at 730. Franke further explains the “‘but for’ [approach] is an evidentiary short cut that Title VII plaintiffs may use
in order to prove sex discrimination,” with its error arising “when the evidentiary methodology stands for, or worse,
is understood to constitute the underlying wrong it is designed to prove.” Id. at 730-31. See infra Part IVC for a
discussion of the decision in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc. requiring comparative evidence for the “but
for” test.
115
See Schultz, supra note 16, at 1762-69 (describing various forms of such “less sexual” behavior in workplace and
its weakening effect on both women’s work competence and sense of self-confidence as employee).
116
See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1169, 1225-29
(1998).
117
See, e.g., Franke, supra note 111, at 762-63 (“[T]he net effect of this kind of [harassing] conduct extends beyond
any particular case in that it solidifies what ‘real men’ and ‘real women’ should be. This dynamic affects all of us . .
. .”).
118
The articles I discuss below are deeply interesting and thought-provoking. Due to page constraints and because
my focus is different than an overarching theoretical perspective, these articles are unfortunately given short shrift
here. I encourage those who have not already done so to read the pieces in full.
119
See Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment With Respect, 111 HARV. L. REV. 445, 448 (1997).
120
See id. at 450-52 (explaining that term “respect” best illustrates what is wrong with creation and continuation of
hostile working environment).
121
Id. at 452-53.
122
See id. at 464-82. Bernstein explains that the reasonable person standard “provides neither gender neutrality nor
meaningful content.” Id. at 471. In addition, the “failure of ‘reasonable women’ to improve on ‘reasonable person,’
the futility of continuing to tinker ad absurdum, and the perils of abandoning objectivity add up to a strong
condemnation of any standard based on reasonableness.” Id. Thus, Bernstein concludes, it is the standard’s
adjective, rather than the noun, that needs to be replaced. Id.
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harassment “betrays the ideal of recognition respect,” which is a sense of recognition of a
person’s inherent worth that is owed to all persons.123 Under this standard, an employer has a
“non-delegable duty to maintain an attitude of responsiveness and attention.”124 By focusing on
the employer’s duty, Bernstein examines the behavior of the harasser as opposed to the harassed.
Instead of asking whether the plaintiff welcomed such behavior, the respectful standard asks
whether “the defendant behave[d] as a respectful person?”125
Much of the behavior that constitutes contra-power harassment violates the duty of a
respectful person. Instinctively, a supervisor is accorded some measure of respect due to her
position. Bernstein refers to this as appraisal respect and defines it in part as “high or special
regard: deferential regard as from a servant to his master: esteem.”126 Bernstein carefully
grounds her theory of the respectful person not in appraisal respect but rather in recognition
respect. Under Kantian principles, recognition respect is owed to all persons as persons.127
Conversely, appraisal respect is not owed to all, only to those to deserving of admiration.128
Thus, Bernstein creates a theory where all persons should be treated with respect, not just those
the majority of society has deemed worthy of respect. Although one could argue that not all
supervisors are deserving of appraisal respect, society expects supervisors to be treated with
deference.129 In a sense, contra-power harassment violates both recognition respect by denying
the inherent worth as a person and appraisal respect by denying the deferential regard arguably
owed to all supervisors.
2. Franke’s Technology of Sexism
Katherine Franke describes sexual harassment as a “technology of sexism” in which
sexual harassment of a woman by a man “embodies fundamental gender stereotypes: men as
sexual conquerors and women as sexually conquered.”130 Therefore, sexual harassment “is a
form of sex discrimination when it reflects or perpetuates gender stereotypes in the
workplace.”131 Sexual harassment of women perpetuates women’s roles as sexual objects and,
therefore, it is discrimination “because of sex.”132 Franke seeks to provide a theoretical context
123

Id. at 452. Bernstein further explains that the ethical duty to render respect postulated in the concept of
“recognition respect” is negative in nature. Id. at 487. This negative duty to “refrain from unjustified or cruel
manifestations of disrespect” has three applications in the context of sexual harassment: recognition respects
requires refraining from (1) treating another only as a means of achieving one’s own ends, (2) humiliating another,
and (3) engaging in conduct that rejects or denies the personhood and self-conception of another. Id.
124
See id. at 495 (arguing that in order for respect to thrive in workplace, “respectful employer” must be seen as
both agent and principal; thus, these responsibilities arise from employer’s own obligations not to promote or
condone hostile workplace).
125
Id. at 501 (“That is, did the defendant regard the complainant as a person, self-propelled and unique, with a range
of potential reactions to sex-based conduct in the workplace?”).
126
Id. at 484 (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 1934 (3d ed. 1981)).
127
See id. at 483-84.
128
See id. at 484.
129
For an argument that the distinction between these two types of respect is not easy to maintain, see Abrams,
supra note 116, at 1179.
130
See Franke, supra note 111, at 693 (arguing that as “technology of sexism,” sexual harassment works as
“disciplinary practice that inscribes, enforces, and polices the identities of both the harasser and victim according to
a system of gender norms,” which effectively delineates women as “feminine sexual objects” and men as “masculine
sexual subjects”).
131
Id. at 696.
132
See id. at 764-65 (noting that by reducing women subordinates in workplace to sex objects, sexual harassment
effectively renders them “less competent and more sexual”).
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from which to draw this inference.133 She focuses on the policing role of sexual harassment
where harassment serves to keep gender non-conformists in line.134 Harassment discourages the
woman who works in the shipyard, the man who will not play along with crude, vulgar horseplay
or the man who is not considered “masculine enough.”135 Further, Franke notes that sexual
harassment harms the harasser as well as the harassee by making the man a sexual aggressor.136
Franke’s theory supports a claim for contra-power harassment. Women deviate from
their assigned gender roles when they enter non-traditional workplaces and when they seek to
supervise other workers. By holding power over workers, particularly over men, women have
violated the societal norm of being passive, sexualized objects and thus must be brought back
into line. Harassment is the means utilized to return women to their rightful roles. However, the
harassment is not always in the form of sexualized behavior. As Franke points out, not all
offensive behavior directed at women is sexist behavior because not all is “because of sex.”137
This may pose a particular evidentiary problem for contra-power harassment cases. Workers
often dislike their supervisors and engage in spiteful conduct. The question for a court is
whether the offensive conduct occurs “because of sex.” Courts must remain vigilant to the
hostility aimed at women supervisors and must consider whether that non-sexualized behavior is
a means of gender regulation.
3. Schultz’s Competence-Centered Account
Vicki Schultz criticizes current sexual harassment theory for placing sexuality - “more
specifically, male-female sexual advances” - at the core of the problem.138 She argues that this
desire-dominance paradigm “has served to exclude from legal understanding many of the most
common and debilitating forms of harassment faced by women (and many men) at work each
day.”139 In this way, the paradigm is underinclusive. Schultz asserts that, in actuality, many of
the most common forms of harassment seek to maintain work in general and, in particular, high
prestige/highly compensated lines of work as “bastions of masculine competence and
authority.”140 As examples of the types of non-sexualized behaviors that undermine women at
work each day, she offers denigrating women’s performance, denying women the perks or
privileges required for success, and deliberate work sabotage.141 Further, Schultz suggests that
133

See id. at 762-66. Franke builds her reconceptualization of sexual harassment as gender harassment on the theory
of sexual harassment as a form of sexual subordination. Id. at 762-63. Extending the subordination analysis to
address the effect the concept’s underlying ideology has upon men, Franke argues that the wrong of gender-based
subordination lies in its power as a regulatory agent with the dual goals of feminizing women and masculinizing
men. Id. at 763. Sexual harassment successfully achieves these “hetero-patriarchal objectives,” either by way of
perpetuating gender norms (as in the traditional cases of men harassing female subordinates in the workplace) or by
“punishing gender non-conformists.” Id. at 763-66.
134
See id. at 765-66 (explaining how sexual harassment disciplines gender deviants by enforcing “law of gender”
that “insists that femininity is the only acceptable expression of femaleness, and that masculinity is the only
acceptable expression of maleness”).
135
Id. at 696.
136
Id. at 763.
137
See id. at 769.
138
Schultz, supra note 16, at 1686.
139
See id. at 1686-87 (noting that great deal “of the gender-based hostility and abuse” endured by women as well as
men is “neither driven by the desire for sexual relations nor even sexual in content”).
140
Id. at 1687 (arguing that harassment must be viewed in context of job segregation).
141
See id. Schultz offers various other examples of non-sexualized harassment including withholding training,
information, or opportunities for women to learn to execute their jobs well, engaging in pranks and taunting, and the
isolation of women from the “social networks that confer a sense of belonging.” Id. While Schultz concedes that
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the prevailing paradigm emphasizes “protection of women’s sexual selves” over their
empowerment as workers.142 In this way, the paradigm is overinclusive. Not all sexual
expression should be considered sexual harassment. Rather, according to Schultz, the focus
“should be on conduct that consigns people to gendered work roles that do not further their own
aspirations or advantage.”143
Schultz, similar to Franke, argues that harassment performs a “gender-guarding,
competence-undermining function: By subverting women’s capacity to perform favored lines of
work, harassment polices the boundaries of the work and protects its idealized masculine image-as well as the identity of those who do it.”144 Thus, Schultz offers a competence-centered
account of sexual harassment.
Schultz incorporates same-sex harassment plaintiffs into her conception of sexual
harassment by arguing that these plaintiffs are harassed because they “detract” from the
workplace as an idealized masculine environment.145 Further, her theory is a means to
“understand some less conventional forms of harassment, such as harassment of female
supervisors by their male subordinates.”146
Contra-power harassment is the quintessential example of Schultz’s reconceptualization
of harassment because the presence of women as supervisors directly threatens the maintenance
of the masculinity of the workplace.147 Any behavior directed at women seeking to undermine
their competency as workers and supervisors should be actionable under Title VII.148 Thus,
contra-power conduct that is not overtly sexual may or may not constitute actionable harassment.
If discussions of sexual matters with a supervisor seek to undermine women and to secure the
workplace for men, then Schultz’s theory would support the contra-power harassment claim.
4. Abrams’s Focus on Subordination
Kathryn Abrams responds to the above theories with a call to retain the focus on the
institutionalization of the subordination of women in the workplace.149 She argues that sexual
harassment should be characterized “as a phenomenon that serves to preserve male control and
entrench masculine norms in the workplace . . . .”150 Thus, the subordination of women should
remain at the center of sexual harassment analyses. Abrams describes the harms of sexual
making a woman the target of sexual attention can undermine her image and self-confidence as a worker, she alleges
that often harassment occurs in a manner that has “little or nothing to do with sexuality but everything to do with
gender.” Id.
142
See id. at 1689 (arguing that doing so allows companies to interpret law as proscribing certain forms of “sexual
expression that do not promote gender hierarchy at work”).
143
Id.
144
See id. at 1691. “By protecting their jobs from incursion by women, or by incorporating women only on inferior
terms, men sustain the impression that their work requires uniquely masculine skills. Maintaining their jobs as
repositories of masculine mastery, in turn, assures men a sense of identity (even superiority) as men.” Id.
145
See id. (explaining that similar to male workers who seek to protect their jobs from encroachment by women, “so
too may male workers seek to denigrate and drive away other men who detract from the perception of their jobs as
the embodiment of an idealized manly competence”).
146
Id. at 1755.
147
See id. at 1767 (noting that as response to such threat, male subordinates may confront “women higher-ups” with
challenges to their power and efforts to sabotage their performance, as “many men have particular difficulty
submitting to the authority of a female boss”).
148
Id. at 1762.
149
See Abrams, supra note 116, at 1171.
150
Id. at 1172.
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harassment as an interference with human agency.151 She brings many same-sex harassment
claims within her account by discussing the “traditionally male prerogative for initiating sex in a
range of contexts and without particular reference to the desires of the target.”152 Thus, the
unilateral imposition of desire makes conduct actionable without regard to the sex of the victim
and the harasser.
Abrams critiques both Franke and Bernstein for departing from the focus on the
subordination of women and Franke for explicitly rejecting the subordination-centered account
of sexual harassment.153 Abrams faults Bernstein’s respectful person standard as obscuring the
“gendered context and meaning of the conduct.”154 Abrams argues that Bernstein has
“depoliticized” and “neutered” the wrong of sexual harassment by failing to conceptualize sexual
harassment as a wrong that occurs in the workplace.155 According to Abrams, Bernstein has
diminished the completeness of her account of sexual harassment.156 Further, Bernstein does not
center her conceptualization of sexual harassment in the gender hierarchy of the workplace.157
Abrams argues that it is of central importance that sexual harassment is perpetrated by the more
powerful members of the hierarchy on the less powerful.158 By individualizing the harm,
151

See id. at 1217-20. Abrams argues that the ultimate harm of sexual harassment “relates both to the workplace as
an institution” and to the workers within it. Id. at 1219. Further, Abrams claims that sexual harassment works to
maintain the workplace as a “site of male control, where gender hierarchy is the order of the day and masculine
norms structure the working environment.” Id. What she alleges to be of such grave concern is not merely that
sexual harassment fortifies sex and gender hierarchy in any institution, but that it does so “in an institution that has
held particular promise for many women, thus compromising the potential opportunities implicit in work, such as
greater economic self-sufficiency and the exploration of new roles and new conceptions of the self not linked to
stereotyped expectations.” Id. at 1219-20. “Indeed, for both women and nonconforming men, sexual harassment
undermines the primary form of agency we retain as complex subjects in a world of multiple social influences: the
capacity to put together the disparate elements of self -- biological being, gendered subject, worker, sexual actor -- to
create a particular, contingent whole in a particular context.” Id. at 1220.
152
Id. at 1211. See also id. at 1225-29 (explaining what proposed account means for same-sex harassment cases,
and doing so to great degree by comparison to Franke’s theoretical focus on “process of gendering”).
153
For the response from Bernstein and Franke to this critique, see Anita Bernstein, An Old Jurisprudence: Respect
in Retrospect, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1231 (1998); Katherine M. Franke, Gender, Sex, Agency and Discrimination: A
Reply to Professor Abrams, 83 CORNELL. L. REV. 1245 (1998). Conversely, Abrams asserts that Vicki Schultz’s
theory “shares many of the assumptions in common with the analysis of sexual harassment I propose here.”
Abrams, supra note 116, at 1171 n.7. However, Abrams differentiates herself from Schultz mainly in her concern
that Schultz’s “‘competence-claiming’ model runs a higher risk of replacing one unitary theory of sexual harassment
with another.” Id. at 1215.
154
Abrams, supra note 116, at 1172.
155
Id. at 1185. Abrams states that Bernstein does comment on the meaning of being humiliated at work, but does so
in passing while arguing that “respect should entail an appreciation of the community that connects the harasser and
the target.” Id. Further, Abrams notes that the “indignity that she defines as harassment’s central harm could occur
anywhere—on the street, in a social institution, in one’s home.” Id. By doing so, Abrams argues, Bernstein neglects
important aspects of the injury that can be “specifically attributable to the fact that it occurs in the workplace.” Id.
156
Id. Abrams contends Bernstein’s theory is weakened by lack of these “work-specific dimensions,” partly because
the humiliation of sexual harassment occurs in a location where it has potential to hinder the “earning of one’s
livelihood and to prevent the achievement of one’s professional fulfillment or self-definition.” Id. Further, Abrams
argues that sexual harassment also takes place “in a setting where women have historically been marginalized or
relegated to distinct and limited roles and where they continue to face hostility and systematic obstacles to
professional progress.” Id.
157
Id. at 1185.
158
See id. at 1185-87 (noting that this hierarchy “shapes not only the workplace but also a range of institutions and
attributes of our social and cultural life,” and that “if we do not appreciate that this dignitary injury is a function of,
and connected to, other injuries within an unequal, hierarchical relationship, we miss much of what is morally and
politically significant about the wrong”).
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Bernstein glosses over the systemic nature of sexual harassment and reduces the need and ability
to prevent it.159
Abrams argues that Franke’s theory fails to focus on the dynamics of the workplace and
of the particular harm caused by sexual harassment in the workplace.160 Although Franke
discusses sexual harassment as a workplace wrong, her theory does not focus on what sexual
harassment means for women in the workplace.161 Abrams criticizes Franke’s choice to reject a
workplace focus and posits that it is part of Franke’s overall rejection of a subordination-based
account of sexual harassment.162
The flaws identified in the subordination-based account of sexual harassment are not
inevitable, according to Abrams.163 She argues a return to the original conception of sexual
harassment as a form of discrimination with the subordination of women at its center.164 She
argues, similar to Schultz, that sexual harassment should be understood as “a means of
establishing male control and expressing or perpetuating masculine norms in the workplace.”165
Where women have entered traditionally male fields, thereby challenging male control, they
have faced particularly flagrant and abusive harassment.166 Other subtler forms of harassment,
such as treating women in a manner that highlights their sexuality or reminding them to act
feminine, send the message to women workers that they are not equal in influence or control.167
As Abrams states, “these forms of harassment suggest that whatever professional goals women
pursue, they will continue to be viewed and judged by reference to more traditional female roles
and whatever careers they enter, they will still occupy subordinate roles.”168
Abrams’s account, then, encompasses certain contra-power harassment situations. As
she discussed in a footnote, the sexualization of a female worker “may be more likely to
disconcert or disenable the target because the conduct seems to be a violat[ion] of the rules of the
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Id. at 1187.
See id. at 1193. For a further discussion of the particular harm that Abrams argues is caused by sexual
harassment in the workplace, see supra note 151 and accompanying text.
161
See id. at 1193-94. Abrams argues that while Franke situates sexual harassment within several “society-wide
dynamics of gender subordination,” she does not adequately address its relation “within the salient dynamics of the
workplace.” Id. at 1193. Abrams states that sexual harassment is unquestionably a form of sex discrimination and
is additionally linked to alternative forms of discrimination taking place outside the workplace. Id. at 1194. Yet
Abrams claims that sexual harassment is also understood under a statute that prohibits employment discrimination
on the basis of sex, while exhibiting “crucial connections to other forms of discrimination that occur in that context.”
Id. Thus, we must examine the particular sex-based dynamics of the workplace to comprehend the practice and
meaning of sexual harassment itself. Id.
162
Id. at 1199-1202. Abrams is convinced Franke’s reason for “de-emphasizing sex based struggles in the
workplace” is her concern for the potential conflict a theory of sex-based subordination would create for the theory
of “gendering” she aims to advance. Id. at 1199. Abrams further argues Franke rejects a subordination-based
account of sexual harassment on three grounds: (1) the theory’s “tendency to biologize the phenomenon;” (2) the
“transitive” logic of the theory which effectively “obscures the multidirectional force of social construction;” and (3)
the theory’s conception of sex as always and already sexist. Id. at 1200-01. But see Franke, supra note 153, at
1250-54 (responding to Abrams’s assessment and explaining that in actuality Abrams and herself “agree more than
we disagree about the normative priority of women’s subordination in a theory of sexual harassment”).
163
Abrams, supra note 116, at 1172.
164
Id. at 1171-72.
165
Id. at 1205.
166
See id. at 1206 (noting such types of harassment as including “physical or sexual aggression,” and “persistent,
targeted verbal abuse so severe as to serve unequivocal notice that women are not welcome”).
167
Id. at 1207-08.
168
Id. at 1208.
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game, in that she expected to be treated as a worker.”169 Contra-power harassment is a
particularly egregious violation of the rules of the game. After working her way up, the female
supervisor is then subjected to equal (if not greater) conduct reminding her that she is not the
boss; she is just a girl.
5. Conclusions
Under all of these conceptualizations of the wrong of sexual harassment, contra-power
harassment is actionable sex discrimination. It is discrimination “because of sex.”170 Harassing
a female supervisor inherently smacks of the desire to drive her from her job so as to retain the
workplace for men and to remind her of her rightful place lower in the hierarchy. Female
supervisors may have organizational power but they may be powerless in terms of societal power
and organizational dynamics.171 Although I am primarily focused on the harassment of female
supervisors, the question of harassment of male supervisors impacts the existence and viability of
the contra-power claim. The sex-role spillover and sociocultural models of sexual harassment do
not explain the harassment of a male supervisor unless the male supervisor is perceived as not
masculine enough. Bernstein would provide a claim to any employee harassed by non-respectful
behavior. Abrams, Franke and Schultz, from slightly different angles, would provide a claim
regardless of the sex of the harasser when the harassment either retains the workplace as a
bastion of male control or enforces traditional gender roles. Certainly, any number of fact
patterns, including the following, may fall into those categories: an effeminate male supervisor is
harassed for not being sufficiently masculine; a male supervisor is harassed for not playing along
with the sexual banter because it makes him uncomfortable or he is harassed because he is not
sexually aggressive enough. These scenarios should be actionable discrimination under Title VII
because each seeks to enforce traditional gender roles and reinstate male norms.
But there is at least one scenario left unanswered. Should the masculine male supervisor
harassed in a sexualized manner by a female subordinate have a claim? Abrams would argue
“yes” because the unilateral imposition of desire on another person is the entrenching of
traditional gender dynamic in the workplace.172 However, this scenario does not fit within
Schultz’s competence-undermining paradigm or Franke’s gendering of workers. By turning the
male supervisor into the sexually pursued, there is an inversion of traditional gender dynamics.173
Thus, under many theories, there is no actionable claim. The male supervisor, who possesses
both organizational and sociocultural power, arguably needs less protection. However, a focus
on the male supervisor’s status as a supervisor will serve to undermine female supervisors’
claims. Because a female worker may be harassed regardless of her organizational power and
some male supervisors have claims that go to the heart of Title VII, all supervisors who are
169

Id. at 1216 n.240 (explaining various ways in which sexualization of women in workplace “cast[s] aspersions on
their work competence”).
170
For a discussion of when courts should draw inferences that certain types of harassment are discrimination
“because of sex,” see infra Part IVC.
171
Martin, supra note 22, at 157.
172
See Abrams, supra note 116, at 1228.
173
Strangely, the masculine male supervisor who is harassed by a female subordinate has his best argument in the
“but for” test that is so soundly rejected by the above theorists. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. If the
male supervisor can prove that the behavior would not have taken place “but for” his sex, then he has a claim under
the “but for” test. For a more in-depth discussion of the “but for” test, see infra Part IVC. I agree with the critiques
of the “but for” test in that the test screens out too many legitimate claims and does not adequately protect women
from harassment in the workplace. Perhaps the “but for” test should be considered as one method to prove
discrimination “because of sex,” rather than the only method.
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harassed “because of sex” should fall within the protection of the statute. This is both logically
consistent and provides less opportunity for the courts to dismiss meritorious claims based
simply on the organizational status of the harasser. The rubber hits the road, of course, when the
evidence is weighed against the specific elements for proving the claim. I turn now to the cases
themselves.
III.

Contra-power Cases

Before turning to the elements of a contra-power claim, I will provide a general
description of the contra-power cases that have reached the federal courts. After a particularly
spectacular effort, my research assistants located twenty-four federal court decisions174 involving
claims of sexual harassment175 in contra-power situations. Of these decisions, eighteen involved
female plaintiffs176 and six involved male plaintiffs;177 six of the decisions involved a “win” for
the plaintiff while the remaining eighteen were losses.178 The intersection of these two factors
174

Although there are twenty-four reported decisions, there are twenty-two cases. One case with a male plaintiff
produced two decisions: one at the motion to dismiss stage, see Jones v. U.S. Gypsum, No. C99-3047-MWB, 2000
WL 196616 (N.D. Iowa Jan. 21, 2000), and one at the summary judgment stage, see Jones v. U.S. Gypsum, 126 F.
Supp. 2d 1172 (N.D. Iowa 2000) (granting summary judgment for employer due to employer’s prompt remedial
action in response to allegations of sexual harassment). One case with a female plaintiff has a published district
court opinion, see Wilson v. Univ. of Texas Health Ctr., 773 F. Supp. 958 (E.D. Tex. 1991) (entering judgment for
defendants after bench trial), and an appellate decision, see Wilson v. Univ. of Texas Health Ctr., 973 F.2d 1263
(5th Cir. 1992) (affirming judgment on sexual harassment claims for defendants). In addition, there are a few state
court cases with contra-power facts. See, e.g., Hanlon v. Chambers, 464 S.E.2d 741 (W.Va. 1995) (hearing female
office supervisor’s sexual harassment complaint based on conduct by male subordinate).
175
We also uncovered a number of claims of racial or national origin harassment in a contra-power situation. See,
e.g., Starks v. New Par, 181 F.3d 103 (6th Cir. 1999); Erebia v. Chrysler Plastic Prods., 772 F.2d 1250 (6th Cir.
1985); Callahan v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., 187 F. Supp. 2d 132 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Peries v. N.Y. City Bd.
of Educ., No. 97-CV-7109(ARR), 2001 WL 1328921 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2001); Underwood v. Northport Health
Servs., Inc., 57 F. Supp. 2d 1289 (M.D. Ala. 1999); Kincade v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 694 F. Supp. 368
(M.D. Tenn. 1987); Nieto v. United Auto Workers, 672 F. Supp. 987 (E.D. Mich. 1987); Moffett v. Gene B. Glick
Co., 621 F. Supp. 244 (N.D. Ind. 1985). These claims raise the same issues of societal power versus organizational
power and are worthy of study. However, I have focused this article on contra-power sexual harassment.
176
See Pfahl v. Synthes (USA), 13 F. App’x 832 (10th Cir. 2001); Ward v. Bechtel, 102 F.3d 199 (5th Cir. 1997);
DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police Officers Ass’n, 51 F.3d 591 (5th Cir. 1995); Wilson v. Univ. of Texas Health
Ctr., 973 F.2d 1263 (5th Cir. 1992); Hill v. K-Mart Corp., 699 F.2d 776 (5th Cir. 1983); Mingo v. Roadway
Express, Inc., 135 F. Supp. 2d 884 (N.D. Ill. 2001); Cleveland v. Int’l Paper Co., No. 96CV1068(RSP/DNH), 1998
WL 690915 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 1998); Malladi v. Brown, 987 F. Supp. 893 (M.D. Ala. 1997); Lewis v. Sugar
Creek Stores, Inc., No. 96-CV-0100E(H), 1996 WL 685730 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 1996); Johnson v. Prof’l Servs.
Group, No. 4-93-1197, 1996 WL 33324813 (D. Minn. Apr. 17, 1996); Humphreys v. Med. Towers, Ltd., 893 F.
Supp. 672 (S.D. Tex. 1995); Ott v. Perk Dev. Corp., 846 F. Supp. 266 (W.D.N.Y. 1994); Cronin v. United Serv.
Stations, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 922 (M.D. Ala. 1992); Wilson v. Univ. of Texas Health Ctr., 773 F. Supp. 958 (E.D.
Tex. 1991); Reynolds v. Atlantic City Convention Ctr. Auth., Civ. A. No. 88-4232, 1990 WL 267417 (D.N.J. 1990);
Kirkland v Brinias, 741 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Tenn. 1989), aff’d, 944 F.2d 905 (6th Cir. 1991); Perkins v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 709 F. Supp. 1487 (W.D. Mo. 1989); Otterstedt v. U.S. Postal Serv., 96 M.S.P.R. 688 (M.S.P.B. 2004).
177
See Davis v. Coastal Int’l Sec., Inc., 275 F.3d 1119 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Garcia v. V. Suarez & Co., 288 F. Supp. 2d
148 (D.P.R. 2003); Needham v. BI, Inc., No. 00 C 1550, 2001 WL 558144 (N.D. Ill. May 21, 2001); Jones v. U.S.
Gypsum, No. C99-3047-MWB, 2000 WL 196616 (N.D. Iowa Jan. 21, 2000); Jones v. U.S. Gypsum, 126 F. Supp.
2d 1172 (N.D. Iowa 2000); Odom v. St. Louis Cmty. Coll., 36 F. Supp. 2d 897 (E.D. Mo. 1999), aff’d, 205 F.3d
1347 (8th Cir. 2000).
178
I counted a decision as a “win” if the plaintiff secured final judgment in her or his favor or survived a motion to
dismiss or for summary judgment. See Ann Juliano & Stewart J. Schwab, The Sweep of Sexual Harassment Cases,
86 CORNELL L. REV. 548, 569 (2001) (defining win rates).
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produces thirteen cases in which female plaintiffs lost and five in which they won; five losses for
male plaintiffs and one win.179
A few courts have explicitly discussed whether a contra-power claim is viable. The court
in Moffett v. Gene B. Glick Co. referred to the organizational status of the parties as a “red
herring.”180 The court stated that the “capacity of any persons to create a hostile or offensive
work environment is not necessarily enhanced or diminished by any degree of authority which
the employer confers on that individual.”181 Moffett added that the hierarchical relationship of
the parties has relevance only in determining the standard of employer liability.182 The status of
the alleged harassers as subordinates did not automatically preclude their creation of a hostile
work environment.183 The opinion in Cronin v. United Service Stations, Inc. echoed similar
sentiments.184 The defendants in Cronin tried to avoid liability by emphasizing that Cronin was
harassed by a subordinate.185 The court recognized the relevance of the contra-power facts
(although without using the term “contra-power harassment”) but said that the existence of
contra-power facts alone does not preclude a claim of sexual harassment.186 The court noted that
a hostile environment can be created by a subordinate just the same as by a supervisor.187
Similarly, in Kirkland v. Brinias, the court recognized that “unlike the situation in the typical
harassment case, the unwelcome behavior came from a subordinate, not a supervisor.”188
Further, the court opined that the behavior in question would create a hostile working
environment for a reasonable person.189
Some courts relied upon the organizational power relationship between the harasser and
the victim to hold that there was no actionable claim. In Odom v. St. Louis Community College,
where the claimant was male, the court found that the “respective positions” of the parties was
the most important factor.190 “[A] subordinate employee could not have created an environment
so pervasively hostile or abusive that it would have affected a term or condition of a reasonable
supervisor’s employment.”191 Although the court expressed doubt about the claim, the doubt
179

This produces an overall win rate of 25% for these cases, both trial and appellate. This is a significantly lower
win rate than found in a previous study of sexual harassment cases. See id. at 576 (finding 51% win rate in district
courts and 39% in appellate courts). Male plaintiffs won 17% of the time (one case) and the female plaintiffs 27%
of the time (five cases). Six cases were heard by appellate courts (one male plaintiff and five female plaintiffs), and
in each case the court found for the defendant.
180
Moffett, 621 F. Supp. at 272. See also Mingo, 135 F. Supp. 2d at 895 (“Although Mingo was a supervisor,
‘plaintiff’s status as supervisor of those harassing [her] . . . is a non-issue’ . . . .”); Lewis, 1996 WL 685730, at *2
(discussing that several courts have rejected argument that, as matter of law, supervisor cannot bring hostile
environment claim if environment is created by subordinates).
181
Moffet, 621 F. Supp. at 272.
182
Id.
183
Id.
184
Cronin v. United Serv. Stations, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 922 (M.D. Ala. 1992) (finding that male subordinate created
hostile work environment for female supervisor and co-workers).
185
Id. at 931.
186
Id. at 931-32 (distinguishing hostile environment harassment from quid pro quo harassment).
187
Id. at 932.
188
Kirkland v. Brinias, 741 F. Supp. 692, 698 (M.D. Tenn. 1989).
189
Id. The court went on to find that the plaintiffs had not suffered any harmful psychological effects. Id. This
decision was issued several years before the Supreme Court’s decision in Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., wherein the
Court held that actual psychological harm is not required to prove a hostile environment claim. See Harris v.
Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 17 (1993). See also infra notes 302-04 and accompanying text (examining make-up
of hypothetical “reasonable person”).
190
Odom v. St. Louis Cmty. Coll., 36 F. Supp. 2d 897, 903 (E.D. Mo. 1999).
191
Id. (noting that plaintiff was not just supervising, but in sole charge at time of incident).
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was couched in an analysis of the severe or pervasive requirement.192 Many courts simply do not
discuss the viability of the contra-power claim.
On a factual level, all but one of the cases in which the plaintiff won involved sexually
explicit comments directed at the plaintiff. For example, in Cleveland v. International Paper
Co., the plaintiff’s subordinates teased her about sexual matters, inquired into her sex life and
occasionally made lewd references to her breasts.193 In Mingo v. Roadway Express, Inc., the
plaintiff was a female dock supervisor who was subjected to continual vulgar conduct by her
male subordinates.194 Several subordinates requested sexual relations with Mingo and one
caressed her arm.195 In Lewis v. Sugar Creek Stores, Inc., a female store manager was
consistently harassed by a male subordinate.196 The subordinate talked about her breasts, asked
to see them, propositioned her for sex, grabbed her breasts and brushed her genital region.197
Similarly, in Cronin, the plaintiff was harassed by an African-American subordinate who called
her a “dumb, old stupid woman,” asked her if she “liked black dick,” touched her on her neck
and shoulder, asked her to have a “good time” with him, and once grabbed her, stating that he
wanted a “good feel.”198 The final winning case for a female plaintiff involved gender
harassment in which the subordinate threw a paperweight at the plaintiff while calling her a bitch
and a whore and remained abusive to the plaintiff throughout her employment.199
In the sole case in which a male plaintiff was successful, a male supervisor alleged that
he was struck in the groin by a female subordinate.200 He further alleged that the employee had
struck other men at the workplace in the groin and the employer had taken no action against
her.201 Against an argument by the employer that a single incident could not constitute a hostile
environment, the court denied the employer’s motion to dismiss.202
In the unsuccessful claims, the factual scenarios also involved sexually explicit comments
or behavior, but the courts found the allegations did not rise to the level of severe or pervasive.
For example, in Johnson v. Professional Services Group, Inc., the plaintiff alleged that a hostile
work environment was created when male subordinates at a recycling center removed
pornographic magazines from the trash and read them at work.203 The court found this behavior
“not severe enough to impose liability.”204 In Kirkland v. Brinias, two female waitresses alleged
that a male busboy had subjected them to sexual advances, propositions, threats and physical
192

For a further discussion of the severe or pervasive requirement, see infra Part IVD.
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(2000) (entitling summary judgment for defendants on Jones’ hostile work environment claim).
203
Johnson v. Prof’l Servs. Group, Inc., No. 4-93-1197, 1996 WL 33324813, at *1 (D. Minn. Apr. 17, 1996).
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Id. at *6. The infamous Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co. decision from the Sixth Circuit also addressed pornography
in the workplace. See Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986). The plaintiff’s complaint hinged
primarily on the behavior of one co-worker. However, plaintiff also made allegations concerning the display of
pornography in the workplace. Because the court did not clearly identify the organizational status of the men who
posted the pornography, I did not include this case.
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contact.205 The court held that neither plaintiff suffered any harmful psychological effects.206 In
Ott v. Perk Development Corp., the only explicit sexual incident occurred when the subordinate
placed a pornographic magazine in his female supervisor’s notebook.207 The court stated that
this incident, when combined with other instances of non-sexually based disparate treatment, was
enough to meet the plaintiff’s prima facie case.208 Nevertheless, the court held that the plaintiff
did not show that the defendant intentionally engaged in a course of sexually harassing conduct
and accordingly granted summary judgment for the employer.209 Likewise, in DeAngelis v. El
Paso Municipal Police Officers Ass’n, the court found that six derogatory gender-based articles
in the local police station paper over the course of two years were not enough to create a hostile
environment.210 In other claims alleging unwelcome sexual remarks or threats and physical
assault by a subordinate, the court found that the employer could not be held liable because the
plaintiff had requested that the employer not take any action,211 the employer had responded
promptly212 or that the behavior of subordinates could not be attributed to the employer.213 Other
contra-power facts presented include a subordinate attempting to kiss his supervisor,214 sexual
touching, comments, propositions215 and general insubordination.216
205

Kirkland v. Brinias, 741 F. Supp. 692, 693 (M.D. Tenn. 1989). Note that this decision was issued prior to the
Supreme Court’s decision in Harris. See supra note 189.
206
Id. at 698 (finding no psychological damage despite presence of hostile and intimidating work environment).
207
Ott v. Perk Dev. Corp., 846 F. Supp. 266, 270 (W.D.N.Y. 1994).
208
Id. at 273 (noting that court must consider totality of circumstances to determine whether plaintiff has met
minimum burden to show unwelcome gender-based harassment).
209
Id. at 275 (dismissing plaintiff’s work shift statistics as insufficient to create genuine issue of fact regarding
plaintiff’s performance evaluations).
210
DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police Officers Ass’n, 51 F.3d 591, 597 (5th Cir. 1995). See also Reynolds v.
Atlantic City Convention Ctr. Auth., Civ. A. No. 88-4232, 1990 WL 267417 (D.N.J. 1990). In Reynolds, the court
rejected the contra-power fact evidence. Id. at *26. The plaintiff alleged, among another things, that her male coworkers resisted her supervision to the point of refusal and quitting rather than working for her. Id. at *5. The court
categorized this evidence as “other harassment” and rejected its usefulness in determining a hostile environment. Id.
at *19. The refusal to work for the plaintiff “is not ‘verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature’ and so does not
figure into the calculus of a sexually offensive working environment.” Id. Because the court found that only three
sexually explicit or obscene comments had been made in her presence, the harassment was not sufficiently severe or
pervasive to amount to a hostile working environment. Id. at *18. See also Pfahl v. Synthes (USA), 13 F. App’x
832, 835 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that, over course of ten years, derogatory language, instance of hugging, and
items twice being left on plaintiff’s desk did not create hostile work environment).
211
See, e.g., Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 638-39 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding employer not liable despite actual
knowledge because plaintiff asked her supervisor to keep conversation confidential).
212
See Ward v. Bechtel Corp., 102 F.3d 199, 202-03 (5th Cir. 1997) (establishing that employer investigated
plaintiff’s allegations and disciplined and reassigned abuser).
213
See Malladi v. Brown, 987 F. Supp. 893, 909 (M.D. Ala. 1997). In a case which can only be referred to as a
“kitchen sink” approach to litigation, the plaintiff alleged that her subordinates made inaccurate comments
concerning her workload and interpersonal skills to the Equal Employment Opportunity counselor investigating her
“ninth” EEO charge. Id. at 900. The plaintiff alleged that these comments had the effect of changing her work
environment and leading to her reassignment. Id. at 909. The court held that the subordinates could not impact the
terms or conditions of plaintiff’s employment. Id.
214
See Wilson v. Univ. of Tex. Health Ctr., 773 F. Supp. 958, 960 (E.D. Texas 1991), aff’d, 973 F.2d 1263 (5th Cir.
1992) (citing subordinate employee’s attempt to kiss plaintiff on neck as element of sexual harassment claim).
215
See Perkins v, Gen. Motors Corp., 709 F. Supp. 1487, 1497 (W.D. Mo. 1989). The court found the plaintiff not
credible in general. Id. at 1498. In regard to the contra-power allegations, the court found that the plaintiff had the
supervisory authority to stop the conduct and punish the offender. Id. at 1500-01.
216
See Hill v. K-Mart Corp., 699 F.2d 776, 777 (5th Cir. 1983). The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that her
authority had been undermined by her subordinates’ behavior which included refusing to listen to her and making
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The complaints by men were similarly treated. In Jones v. United States Gypsum, the
plaintiff alleged he was physically assaulted by a female subordinate who grabbed him in the
groin area.217 The plaintiff in Garcia v. V. Suarez & Co. alleged repeated sexual touching by
employees of each other’s buttocks, sexually explicit comments, exposure, and an attempt at oral
sex by a subordinate.218 In Davis v. Coastal International Security, Inc., the plaintiff alleged that
his male co-workers engaged in a campaign of harassment against him, including slashing his
tires and making vulgar comments and obscene gestures.219 In Needham v. BI, Inc., the plaintiff
alleged that he was harassed by a female subordinate who rubbed against him, called him at
home to discuss her personal life and generally asked the plaintiff to be responsible for the
subordinate’s personal life.220
In Odom v. St. Louis Community College, the plaintiff alleged he was subject to a hostile
work environment created by a female subordinate.221 Specifically, he alleged that the
subordinate made sexually explicit comments such as suggesting that the plaintiff could put
Vaseline on his crotch, noting the size of plaintiff’s thumbs and remarking that she was glad that
he was not her gynecologist, and sticking a doughnut between her legs, indicating that the
doughnut had been there earlier.222 The most explicit incident occurred when the subordinate
followed the plaintiff to his office, rubbed her genital area while commenting that she was “hot
and horny” and that someone would need to get a mop to “clean up the puddle she had just left
on the floor.”223 The court found that the behavior was not aimed at altering the conditions of
the plaintiff’s employment.224
In sum, the facts alleged in contra-power cases are not dissimilar from the “typical” coworker or supervisor harassment case. Courts do seem to give less credence to claims by male
supervisors that their female subordinates have harassed them. Further, many courts look
askance on female supervisors complaining about their subordinates. But if the facts are not
overtly dissimilar from the conventional harassment claim, does the contra-power claim itself
need to change?

racial remarks. Id. at 779. “We are convinced that [the plaintiff] stood above the remarks and her position or
authority suffered nothing because of them.” Id. at 778.
217
Jones v. U.S. Gypsum, 126 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1174 (N.D. Iowa 2000). The court found that the employer had
acted appropriately in response to the complaints of harassment. Id. at 1179.
218
Garcia v. V. Suarez & Co., 288 F. Supp. 2d 148, 153 (D.P.R. 2003). The court found that the employer acted
appropriately in response to the sexual encounter by investigating and dismissing the harasser. Id. at 159. Further,
the plaintiff was not exposed to any disadvantageous conditions to which female co-worker would not be exposed.
Id. at 160.
219
Davis v. Coastal Int’l Sec., Inc., 275 F.3d 1119, 1121-22 (D.C. Cir. 2002). The court found no evidence that the
harassment was because of the sex of the plaintiff as opposed to a workplace grudge. Id. at 1125-26.
220
Needham v. BI, Inc., No. 00 C 1550, 2001 WL 558144, at *4-5 (N.D. Ill. May 21, 2001). In this case, the
plaintiff was fired because the employer believed he had sexually harassed a subordinate. Id. at *1. The plaintiff
alleged that the subordinate had harassed him. Id. at *3. Because the female subordinate was not dismissed,
plaintiff argued that his dismissal was discrimination on the basis of sex. Id. at *6. The court granted summary
judgment to the employer on the grounds that plaintiff had no evidence that his firing was based on sex. Id. at *8.
221
Odom v. St. Louis Cmty. Coll., 36 F. Supp. 2d 897, 899 (E.D. Mo. 1999).
222
Id. at 900-01 (recounting instances of subordinate’s inappropriate and sexually-charged exchanges with plaintiff).
223
Id. at 901. Another co-worker also witnessed the subordinate’s actions and told the subordinate that these actions
were “offensive.” Id.
224
Id. at 903 (noting that actions of individual subordinate did not meet severity or pervasive requirements to
sufficiently affect plaintiff’s terms or conditions of employment).
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IV.

Creating the Claim

As is evident from the above descriptions of contra-power cases, the behavior
complained of in a contra-power case is often no different than that complained of in a
“standard” hostile environment case. The question then is whether the regular elements of a
hostile environment claim may be applied to a contra-power case or whether the requirements
must be adjusted to fit the atypical fact pattern. I address the first four elements of a hostile
environment case in this Part and turn to the question of employer liability in Part V.
A hostile environment claim arises when an employee must endure verbal or physical
abuse based on a protected characteristic as part of the “terms [or] conditions” of employment
but does not suffer a tangible job detriment.225 These claims were first recognized in the early
1980s.226 From these cases, a five-part test emerged for a hostile environment claim based on
sex. The plaintiff must show: (1) that the employee is a member of a protected class; (2) that the
employee was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment, including sexual advances, requests for
sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature;227 (3) that the harassment
complained of was because of sex; (4) that the harassment complained of was severe or
pervasive enough to affect a term, condition or privilege of employment; and (5) employer
liability for the behavior and failure to take prompt remedial action.228
Although more than twenty years old, these five elements essentially remain today.229
Each element has been further interpreted by the courts. Below I consider each element, how it
is applied in a “standard” hostile environment case, how courts are applying it in contra-power
cases, and what modifications, if any, should be made for the contra-power claim.
A. A Member of the Protected Class
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Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971). This type of hostile environment claim was originally
recognized in Rogers as a national origin claim under Title VII. See id. at 237.
226
See, e.g., Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 901 (11th Cir. 1982) (agreeing that offensive or hostile work
environment can violate Title VII irrespective of whether plaintiff suffers tangible job detriment); Bundy v. Jackson,
641 F.2d 934, 943-44 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (finding sex discrimination where employer created or condoned
substantially discriminatory work environment regardless of whether complaining employees lost any tangible job
benefits as result of discrimination).
227
See Henson, 682 F.2d at 901. Although the Henson court formulated the test as requiring sexualized conduct,
some courts have acknowledged claims of a hostile environment based on non-sexualized behavior. See, e.g.,
Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, 1485 (3d Cir. 1990) (finding overt sexual harassment not necessary to
establish sexually hostile environment); Hall v. Gus Contsr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1014 (8th Cir. 1988) (“Intimidation
and hostility toward women because they are women can obviously result from conduct other than explicit sexual
advances.”); Ott v. Perk Dev. Corp., 846 F. Supp. 266, 273 (W.D.N.Y. 1994) (“However, the conduct underlying a
sexual harassment claim need not be sexual in nature as long as the conduct is directed at the employee because of
his or her sex.”).
228
See Henson, 682 F.2d at 903-05.
229
Some courts no longer explicitly require the plaintiff to prove that the conduct was “unwelcome” when making a
hostile environment claim based on sex. See, e.g., Petrosino v. Bell Atl., 385 F.3d 210, 221 (2d Cir. 2004)
(requiring only that (1) sufficiently severe and pervasive discriminatory intimidation permeated and altered
conditions of work environment, and (2) specific basis exists to impute employer liability); Buffa v. N.J. State Dep’t
of Judiciary, 56 F. App’x 571, 575 (3d Cir. 2003) (requiring only that plaintiff prove (1) discrimination because of
her [disability], and (2) this conduct was sufficiently severe and pervasive to create hostile environment for
reasonable person).
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The court in Henson v. City of Dundee described this element as requiring “a simple
stipulation that the employee is a man or a woman.”230 Not all courts require this element of the
claim.231 Arguably, proving the plaintiff is a member of the protected class is an absolute, albeit
formal, requirement. Without establishing this element, the protections of Title VII are not
triggered. For example, a male employee who alleges that he is harassed because he is gay has
not shown he is within the protected class and thus has no cognizable claim.
However, these theoretical issues are considered in the context of the “because of sex”
requirement, which is language taken directly from Title VII.232 Under this requirement, as
discussed below, the plaintiff must prove that she or he was harassed due to her or his sex. Thus,
as Professor Beiner has aptly stated, “this element adds nothing to the claim, given that the
plaintiff must already prove that she was harassed based on her sex.”233 As could then be
expected, contra-power cases do not present any distinct issues for this element.
B. Subject to Unwelcome Harassment
The Henson court described the element of unwelcomeness as requiring the plaintiff to
prove that she did not solicit or “incite” the behavior and that she found it undesirable or
offensive.234 The Supreme Court, in its first ruling recognizing a hostile environment claim, held
that “the gravamen of any sexual harassment claim is that the alleged sexual advances were
‘unwelcome.’”235 The Court then allowed the possibility that a plaintiff’s sexually provocative
speech or dress is relevant to determine whether certain sexual advances were unwelcome.236
The unwelcome requirement has been much criticized for placing the plaintiff on trial
and for requiring the plaintiff to assume the burden of proving what should be a defense.237 I
have previously called for its abolishment or, barring that, for a restriction on the type of
evidence that may be considered to prove, or more importantly, to disprove the
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Henson, 682 F.2d at 903.
The Second, Third, Fourth and Seventh Circuits do not appear to require the plaintiff to prove that she is a
member of the protected class as a formal element of the claim. See, e.g., Clegg v. Falcon Plastics, Inc., No. 051826, 2006 WL 887937, at *4 (3d Cir. 2006); Whittaker v. N. Ill. Univ., 424 F.3d 640, 645 (7th Cir. 2005); Bhella v.
England, 91 F. App’x 835, 846 (4th Cir. 2004); Gregory v. Daly, 243 F.3d 687, 691-92 (2d Cir. 2001). Although
some decisions in the Tenth Circuit do not list this element as a requirement, see Smith v. EEOC, No. 05-2049, 2006
WL 1230680, slip op. at *3 (10th Cir. 2006), others do. See Dick v. Phone Directories Co., 397 F.3d 1256, 1263
(10th Cir. 2005).
232
See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(k) (1964) (defining terms “because of sex” and “on the basis
of sex”).
233
Beiner, supra note 79, at 9.
234
See Henson, 682 F.2d at 903 (citing Gan v. Kepro Circuit Sys., Inc., No. 81-268 C(5), 1982 WL 166 (E.D. Mo.
1982); Vinson v. Taylor, No. 78-1793, 1980 WL 100 (D.D.C. 1980); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1980)).
235
Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986).
236
See id. at 69. The Court ruled that the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit was erroneous in its
decision that testimony admitted into evidence by the District Court and given about the respondent’s “dress and
personal fantasies” had no place in the litigation. Id. The Court explained further that the “evidence is obviously
relevant” as the “EEOC guidelines emphasize that the trier of fact must determine the existence of sexual
harassment in light of ‘the record as a whole’ and ‘the totality of circumstances, such as the nature of the sexual
advances and the context in which the alleged incidents occurred.’” Id.
237
See, e.g., Mary F. Radford, By Invitation Only: The Proof of Welcomeness in Sexual Harassment Cases, 72 N.C.
L. REV. 499 (1994) (questioning validity of current model of proof as to unwelcome requirement and proposing
alternative method which would require proof of welcomeness rather than unwelcomeness in sexual harassment
cases).
231
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“unwelcomeness” of the behavior.238 Some circuits have responded to the critiques by not
requiring a showing of “unwelcomeness,”239 though many still maintain the requirement.240
Although fewer cases are thrown out for failure to meet this requirement than any other
element,241 the unwelcome requirement continues to garner interest in the scholarly
community.242 In recent years, some feminist scholars have argued strongly and convincingly
that the unwelcome requirement should be retained.243 These arguments are often cast in terms
of women’s agency. Women’s agency refers to the ability of women to define the role-relations
they wish to engage in at work through their performance. Professor Franke has argued that
removing the requirement casts doubt on women’s ability to consent to or reject sexual
advances.244 The unwelcome requirement “clearly presupposes a degree of female agency in
these contexts.”245 Again, women may wish to engage in certain conduct or discussions with
some co-workers but not others.
Professor Abrams also seeks to recognize and support female agency while protecting
women from sexual harassment. She proposes moderating the unwelcome requirement by
contextualizing the type of behavior alleged to have created the hostile environment.246 She
argues that for sexual propositions, touchings and nonsexual forms of harassment, a showing of
unwelcomeness should not be required.247 Rather, the plaintiff should show that “the conduct
was unilateral or disregarding her desires.”248 However, Abrams argues that in regard to
238

Ann C. Juliano, Note, Did She Ask For It?: The “Unwelcome” Requirement in Sexual Harassment Cases, 77
CORNELL L. REV. 1558, 1587-92 (1992) (arguing that only evidence of specific interactions between employee
victim and harasser should be admissible at trial).
239
See, e.g., Petrosino v. Bell Atl., 385 F.3d 210, 221 (2d Cir. 2004); Buffa v. N.J. State Dep’t of Judiciary, 56 F.
App’x 571, 576 (3d Cir. 2003).
240
See, e.g., Harris-Childs v. Medco Health Solutions Inc., 169 F. App’x 913, 917 (5th Cir. 2006); Kelly v. Senior
Ctrs., Inc., 169 F. App’x 423, 428 (6th Cir. 2006); Parker v. Atlanta Newspapers Name Holding Corp., No. 0515722, 2006 WL 1594427, at *2 (11th Cir. June 12, 2006); Noviello v. City of Boston, 398 F.3d 76, 92 (1st Cir.
2005); Whittaker v. N. Ill. Univ., 424 F.3d 640, 645 (7th Cir. 2005); Gilooly v. Mo. Dep’t of Health and Senior
Servs., 421 F.3d 734, 738 (8th Cir. 2005); Dick v. Phone Directories Co., 397 F.3d 1256, 1263 (10th Cir. 2005);
Bhella v. England, 91 F. App’x 835, 845 (4th Cir. 2004); Vasquez v. County of L.A., 349 F.3d 634, 642 (9th Cir.
2003).
241
See Beiner, supra note 79, at 90.
242
See, e.g., Janine Benedet, Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment Claims and the Unwelcome Influence of Rape
Law, 3 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 125 (1995); Henry L. Chambers, Jr., (Un)Welcome Conduct and the Sexually Hostile
Environment, 53 ALA. L. REV. 733 (2002); Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 826-34 (1991);
Juliano, supra note 238; Elsie Mata, Note, Title VII Quid Pro Quo and Hostile Environment Claims: Changing the
Legal Framework Courts Use to Determine Whether Challenged Conduct is Unwelcome, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
791 (2001); Miranda Oshige, Note, What’s Sex Got to Do with It?, 47 STAN. L. REV. 565 (1995); Radford, supra
note 237; Joan S. Weiner, Note, Understanding Unwelcomeness in Sexual Harassment Law: Its History and a
Proposal for Reform, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621 (1997); Casey J. Wood, “Inviting Sexual Harassment”: The
Absurdity of the Welcomeness Requirement in Sexual Harassment Law, 38 BRANDEIS L.J. 423 (2000).
243
See Franke, supra note 111, at 746-47 (arguing in favor of retaining unwelcome requirement and against
alternative of presuming that all sexual conduct in workplace is unwelcome).
244
Id. at 746.
245
Id. at 746-47.
246
Abrams, supra note 116, at 1221.
247
See id. (explaining that with nonsexual forms of harassment such as “derogation of opportunity, failure to train,
or sabotage of equipment unwelcomeness should be assumed,” and that cases involving “sexual propositions or
touchings entail a substantial risk of a trial of the victim, in which a range of stereotypes hostile to women’s
sexuality may be mobilized”).
248
See id. at 1222. Abrams argues this is a better approach, as unwelcomeness is the wrong standard in such a
context. Id. She contends that the standard used “should not focus triers' attention on the nature of the target's
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sexualized talk or representations, the courts should not presume that such behavior is
unacceptable.249 Abrams argues that the unwelcome requirement in such cases recognizes
women’s agency.250 She cautions that courts should be flexible in the type of evidence that may
show unwelcomeness, such as leaving the room or changing the subject.251 Similarly, Professor
Schultz reaches the same end as Abrams, although by different means. Recall that her focus is
on competence-undermining activity, much of it non-sexual. She argues that once courts
reconceptualize sexual harassment as an assault on competence, “the unwelcomeness inquiry
makes no sense. Although some people may welcome expressions of sexual interest, few
employees invite conduct that attacks their work performance in the name of gender
conformity.”252
Only three of the contra-power cases discuss the unwelcome requirement in more than
passing.253 None of the courts in these cases hinge their analysis on the nature of the contrapower facts. In Cronin v. United Serv. Stations, Inc., the court simply noted that it credited the
plaintiff’s testimony that she had indicated to the harasser that his advances were not
welcome.254 Further, the court found that the harasser knew his advances were unwelcome.255
The plaintiff refused to go out with the harasser and repeatedly asked him not to touch her.256
When the harasser tried to strike her, she fired him.257 The court also rejected a particularly
irrelevant and offensive argument of the defendant. The employer argued that the plaintiff was
abused at home and therefore could not have viewed the behavior at work as unwelcome.258 The
court soundly rejected this line of attack.259 In Humphreys v. Medical Towers, Ltd., defendants
argued that the plaintiff had invited the harasser’s behavior because she and the harasser fought
with each other on a regular basis.260 The court found that the plaintiff had presented sufficient
evidence that the plaintiff neither made derogatory statements about the harasser nor provoked or
invited hostile behavior.261 Thus, the court denied summary judgment.262 In Perkins v. General
Motors Corp., one of the many reasons that the plaintiff was unsuccessful in her claim was the
response but on the nature of the perpetrator's act.” Id. Thus, the question to ask is “not whether sexual advances in
the workplace are presumptively acceptable but whether the coercive imposition of sex is forbidden.” Id.
249
See id. “In the case of sexualized talk or representations, a showing of unwelcomeness may be more appropriate
because the plaintiff’s response is less likely to be assimilated to stigmatizing stereotypes.” Id.
250
See id.
251
See id. (explaining courts should not require all plaintiffs to prove unwelcomeness by “contemporaneous verbal
objection to the perpetrator,” yet should accept evidence of unwelcomeness through more standard responses that
“reflect the constraints under which many sexual harassment victims operate”).
252
Schultz, supra note 16, at 1802.
253
See Humphreys v. Med. Towers, Ltd., 893 F. Supp. 672 (S.D. Tex. 1995); Cronin v. United Serv. Stations, Inc.,
809 F. Supp. 922 (M.D. Ala. 1992); Perkins v. Gen. Motors Corp., 709 F. Supp. 1487 (W.D. Mo. 1989).
254
See Cronin, 809 F. Supp. at 929 (M.D. Ala. 1992) (noting that court was “convinced that Cronin indicated to
Webster that his advances were not welcome” and that “evidence indicates that Cronin ‘did not solicit or incite’
Webster’s conduct and that she ‘regarded the conduct as undesirable or offensive’”).
255
Id.
256
Id.
257
Id.
258
Id. at 932.
259
See id. (stating argument lacked merit and fact that Cronin “may have been abused at home in no way means that
Cronin deserved abuse at work, that she ‘welcomed’ Webster’s abuse, or that she could not possibly be affected by
Webster’s actions because she was used to such abuse”).
260
Humphreys v. Med. Towers, Ltd., 893 F. Supp. 672, 683 (S.D. Tex. 1995).
261
Id.
262
Id. at 684.
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unwelcome requirement.263 The court found the plaintiff was an “active, encouraging participant
in sexually explicit conversations and actions” by co-workers and subordinates.264 Further, the
court found that in the “few” circumstances where the conduct went too far, the plaintiff had the
“ability to take care of the situation and to stop that conduct.”265
In sum, the contra-power case law does not suggest a need for a change in the unwelcome
requirement specific to contra-power cases. However, I argue for a modification to the
requirement. Courts should adopt Schultz and Abrams’s argument that sexual propositions and
touchings, as well as non-sexual harassing behavior, are inherently not welcome. I would go the
next step and argue that the courts should presume that sexualized behavior is unwelcome when
directed at a supervisor from a subordinate. I realize that this modification implicates women’s
agency. The focus on women’s agency is one which I fully support. Women should not be held
to Victorian ideals nor be required to remove any sexually based conversations from their
workplace in order to remain as “acceptable” plaintiffs. In fact, the importance of recognizing
and supporting women’s agency forms the basis for my recommendations on employer liability.
However, social science research supports my proposed modification for the unwelcome
requirement. Women have indicated that contra-power harassment is more likely to be
considered unwelcome than co-worker harassment.266 Further, because female supervisors are
already acting outside of prescribed gender roles, they often face a heightened effort by male
subordinates attempting to reinforce traditional norms. The arguments against the unwelcome
requirement are especially relevant to claims of contra-power harassment. Therefore, courts
should presume that harassing behavior directed at a supervisor from a subordinate is
unwelcome.
C. Because of Sex
Title VII prohibits discrimination “because of . . . sex.” As described above in Part IIB,
proving that sexual harassment is discrimination “because of sex” was one of the initial hurdles
for the claim.267 Once the concept of the claim was accepted, the premise was not questioned for
many years. The issue of same-sex harassment raised the fundamental questions anew. Scholars
proposed a number of fascinating theoretical constructs to provide an actionable claim for samesex harassment.268 The Supreme Court provided guidance and sowed the seeds of confusion in
its Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc. decision.269
In a decision authored by Justice Scalia, the Court held that Title VII prohibits same-sex
harassment.270 Mr. Oncale worked on an offshore oil platform with seven other men. A coworker and two supervisors threatened to rape him, sexually assaulted him and subjected him to
263

See Perkins v. Gen. Motors Corp., 709 F. Supp. 1487, 1500 (W.D. Mo. 1989). In regard to the plaintiff’s
sexually hostile work environment claim, the court noted that Perkins failed to satisfy her burden of proving that the
unwelcome incidents that did occur “reasonably affected a term, condition or privilege of her employment.” Id. at
1501. Further, the court claimed Perkins failed to prove that her employer knew or should have known of the
harassment that she complained of and failed to take proper remedial action. Id.
264
Id. at 1500.
265
Id. at 1500-01.
266
Wayne, supra note 16, at 319.
267
See supra Part IIB.
268
Or at least most forms of it. See Franke, supra note 111, at 766-67 (arguing that requests for sexual favors by gay
supervisors or male employees should not be actionable as sexual harassment but rather as disparate treatment sex
discrimination claims).
269
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
270
Id. at 82.
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other humiliating actions.271 The district court and the Fifth Circuit dismissed the claim, holding
that same-sex harassment was not actionable under Title VII.272
The Supreme Court reversed, without resort to grand theory.273 Rather, Justice Scalia
relied on the plain language of the statute and held that Title VII prohibits discrimination because
of sex.274 Thus, a victim must simply show that the conduct was directed at the plaintiff because
of her sex.275 In other words, she has suffered treatment that members of the other sex do not.276
Same-sex harassment is therefore prohibited regardless of whether the harasser or the victim is
homosexual.277 The Court specifically discussed a showing of “direct comparative evidence
about how the alleged harasser treated members of both sexes in a mixed-sex workplace.”278 In
addition, the Court instructed lower courts to determine whether a hostile environment exists
“from the perspective of the reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position, considering ‘all the
circumstances.’”279 The Court then offered an example of such circumstances: whether the
football coach smacks the butt of his secretary in the office or one of his players on the field.280
The Court then remanded for further proceedings.281
This simple statutory interpretation has created a great deal of confusion. First, the
Court’s focus on the statutory language reinvigorates the “but for” test of sexual harassment.
Some courts have strictly construed the “but for” test.282 Unless a plaintiff can prove she was
targeted for harassment because she is a woman, she cannot prove the “because of sex”
requirement.283 For example, if a workplace is rife with sexually derogatory language and
sexually explicit comments and all employees are subject to this environment, the plaintiff will
not be able to show that she experiences disadvantageous conditions that male employees do not
experience.284
Second, in order to meet the “but for” test under the Oncale opinion, a plaintiff will need
some sort of comparator group. That is, the plaintiff must show that she or he was treated
differently than workers of the opposite sex. So plaintiffs like Mr. Oncale, who worked only
with men, will be without a viable means to meet the test.
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For contra-power claims, Oncale provides the theoretical underpinnings of an actionable
claim. As long as the victim-supervisor proves that she was the target of the conduct because of
her sex, she has an actionable claim. In fact, Justice Scalia’s emphasis on the statutory language
makes various factual scenarios actionable under Title VII, including a same-sex, contra-power
claim. Anticipating the criticism that Title VII will cease to be meaningful if any and all fact
patterns fall within it, I have two responses. First, this is the import of Justice Scalia’s decision.
As long as the evidentiary standard is met for “because of sex,” no claim is ruled out. Second, in
practice, the claim will not be stretched beyond all meaning because the evidentiary issues will
limit the successful claims.
Meeting the evidentiary burden in practice is difficult. In Davis v. Coastal International
Security, Inc., the plaintiff alleged that he was harassed by two subordinates who slashed his tires
and made obscene verbal comments and gestures.285 Noting that the plaintiff had disciplined the
alleged harassers, the court found that “there is simply no evidence that they were harassing Mr.
Davis because of their gender or because of his gender.”286 Thus, even though the plaintiff’s
claim was based at least in part on obscene comments and gestures, the court rejected any
finding of “because of sex.”287 Similarly, in Garcia v. V. Suarez & Co., the plaintiff alleged a
hostile environment created by “salesmen touching each other’s buttocks at work [and] making
sexually explicit statements,” culminating in a sexual encounter with a male subordinate in a
hotel.288 With respect to the generalized behavior, the court found that the plaintiff’s claim
foundered on the “because of sex” requirement.289 “The [c]ourt’s main concern is that the
behavior complained of does not display any discrimination based on sex. It does not appear that
Plaintiff was exposed to any disadvantageous condition of employment [to] which a female coworker would not be exposed.”290 Although the court labeled the environment “inappropriate
and explicit,” it was not discriminatory on the basis of sex.291 These decisions are both postOncale and are examples in practice of the criticisms against the opinion.292
Although these decisions seem to suggest that courts invoke the “because of sex”
requirement to dismiss a claim by the plaintiff, there is one contra-power case which holds, in
favor of the plaintiff, that the actions were “because of sex.”293 This final contra-power case
discussing “because of sex” involves a woman harassed by a male subordinate.294 The court
found that the harasser’s comments and behavior were “derogatory and insulting to women
generally, and overtly demeaning to [the plaintiff] personally.”295 Further, his behavior “reflects
an attitude that women are to be viewed as only objects of ridicule, abuse, or sexual pleasure.”296
The court adopted the “but for” test: “but for the fact that Cronin was a woman, she would not
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have been subject to such harassment.”297 Therefore, the court found the “because of sex”
requirement met.
What are the evidentiary issues for a contra-power case? Social science research
hypothesizes that those lower in organizational status will harass to re-establish societal power.
Men will harass when the supervisor is not “one of the guys” – either because this is literally
true, in the case of a female supervisor, or because the supervisor is gay or perceived as gay.298
A particular evidentiary problem for contra-power harassment is the very nature of the claim the boss is being harassed. It is not unheard of to give the boss a difficult time. This, of course,
begs the question. If the subordinates dislike the female supervisor because she is a female
supervisor, then an actionable claim is present. It is the intersection of sex and power that causes
the subordinates to react with harassing behavior. By singling out the female supervisors, the
subordinates have chosen to harass “because of sex.” The fact that female co-workers are not
harassed has no evidentiary bearing on whether the female supervisor has been singled out
because of her sex. If this is the intersection between sex and power, the presence of “sex” in the
calculation is enough to trigger liability under the statute.299 Even if male supervisors are
harassed as well as the female supervisors, a female supervisor may still be able to prove her
claim, depending on the form the harassment takes. Take, for example, pornography. Deborah
Tannen has argued that the use of pornography to harass women is different from the hazing
male subordinates may give a new male boss.299a The mere existence of a woman with power is
a challenge to masculine control of the workplace.
Thus, when a female supervisor is harassed by a subordinate and the harassment takes the
form of sexualized, gender-role-enforcing behavior, a court should draw the inference that
harassment is because of sex without requiring additional evidence. 299b Although I agree with
other commentators that courts should not focus exclusively on sexualized behavior, this
behavior carries a sufficient sting such that courts may properly presume the behavior is
“because of sex.” Conduct that seeks to remind a female supervisor that she does not deserve the
position because she is a woman is behavior because of sex. Therefore, conduct aimed at
undermining the authority and power of a female supervisor should carry evidentiary weight that
the conduct is motivated “because of” the sex of the supervisor.
D. Severe or Pervasive to Alter the Terms or Conditions of Employment
In order to bring sexual harassment without a loss of an employment benefit within the
purview of the statute, the conduct must effect a “term or condition” of employment.300 Thus,
the fourth element of a hostile environment claim is that the conduct at issue was sufficiently
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severe or pervasive to alter the terms or conditions of the plaintiff’s employment.301 In Harris v.
Forklift Systems, Inc., the Supreme Court explained that this fourth element has both an objective
and subjective component.302 To prove this element, a plaintiff must establish that a reasonable
person would find the conduct at issue sufficiently offensive to alter the terms or conditions of
plaintiff’s employment.303 In addition, the plaintiff must establish she was subjectively
offended.304
In Harris, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff need not suffer actual psychological
harm to bring a claim.305 Rather, the Court stated that a fact finder must consider the “totality of
the circumstances” to determine whether the conduct at issue was sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the terms or conditions of the plaintiff’s employment.306 The Court offered a
non-exhaustive list of factors for the fact finder to consider, including “the frequency of the
discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere
offensive utterance;” whether the conduct “unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work
performance;” and the “effect [of the conduct] on the employee’s psychological well-being.”307
The Court added to this list in the Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services Inc. decision.308 In
discussing “all the circumstances” to be considered under the objective part of the severe or
pervasive requirement, the Court noted the importance of the social context “in which particular
behavior occurs and is experienced by the target.”309
301
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Similar to the other elements of the hostile environment claim, the severe or pervasive
standard has received its fair share of criticism. First, because of the objective standard
embedded in this requirement, the debate over the make-up of “reasonable person” applies to this
fourth element.310 Second, the severe or pervasive standard places a significant amount of
harassing conduct beyond the reach of the law.311 Third, this standard invites courts to substitute
their own judgment for that of the community. Professor Beiner notes that courts often declare
that no reasonable person could find the behavior sufficiently severe or pervasive, thereby taking
the cases away from the jury.312 By removing cases from the jury, “judges are impeding the
development of a community standard” of what is unacceptable sexual harassment.313 Finally,
the inclusion by the Oncale court of the “social context” as one of the circumstances to be
considered engendered much criticism.314
The question then for a contra-power harassment case is whether the organizational status of
the harasser vis-a-vis the victim is a “circumstance” which should be considered. Although
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some of the contra-power decisions simply recite the allegations and hold that the conduct either
was or was not severe or pervasive enough,315 other courts explicitly discuss the contra-power
nature of the harassment.316 These courts expressed doubts about the intimidating nature of the
working environment given the contra-power nature of the facts. For example, in Kirkland v.
Brinias, the court found that the plaintiffs were “subjected to sexual harassment on the job.”317
However, the court diminished the import of the harassment. “[U]nlike the situation in the
typical harassment case, the unwelcome behavior came from a subordinate, not a supervisor.”318
The contra-power relationship was the “most important” fact to the court in Odom v. St. Louis
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Community College.319 The court noted that the plaintiff was the one in a position of authority
and could determine the conditions of employment for the subordinate.320 Because, at times, the
plaintiff was solely in charge of the office, the court held a “subordinate employee could not
have created an environment so pervasively hostile or abusive that it would have affected a term
or condition of a reasonable supervisor’s employment.”321 Similarly, the court in DeAngelis v.
El Paso Municipal Police Officers Ass’n opined that the plaintiff’s Title VII case was not
compelling.322 Factoring in the decision was that the plaintiff was not “preyed upon by a
superior,” but was in a “command position” herself.323 Thus, the totality of circumstances did
not equate to a severe or pervasive hostile environment.324
The plaintiff’s position of authority also contributed to a finding for the defendant in Hill
v. K-Mart Corp.325 Hill was a black female supervisor who brought Title VII and §1981 charges
against her employer, K-Mart, for racial and sexual harassment by subordinates.326 One
subordinate who made a racial slur was a white female and the other was of an unidentified race
and gender.327 Hill also complained about a white male subordinate who harassed her, but the
court noted that this subordinate treated all supervisors with equal disrespect regardless of race or
gender.328 Of major importance to the decision was the fact that the two racial incidents did not
significantly impact Hill’s position of authority.329 The court was convinced that Hill “stood
above” the remarks and that her position suffered nothing as a result.330 Thus, it found that the
record of harassment was not severe or pervasive enough.331
One of the most straightforward discussions of the interaction between contra-power
harassment and the “severe or pervasive” requirement is from a race discrimination case. In
Erebia v. Chrysler Plastic Products Corp., Judge Kennedy wrote a strong dissenting opinion that
questioned the ability of a subordinate to create a hostile environment.332 The dissent thought the
evidence of racial hostility was insufficient to support a claim.333 At any single time during
Erebia’s tenure, depending on the department, he was subject to racial slurs by a single white
male subordinate.334 The dissent opined that Erebria’s claim that a single subordinate making
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racial slurs “dominated the foreman’s working environment” was the “weakest case of all.”335
It continued by showing examples of other cases where the hostile environment was more
widespread and stated that “the bigotry of one subordinate does not poison the working
atmosphere to the extent it was poisoned in these cases.”336
It is this very attitude which necessitates a focus on the contra-power claim and a change
to the “totality of the circumstances” approach. Courts should not consider the organizational
relationship between the harasser and harassee at this point in the analysis. Rather, courts should
consider whether the behavior at issue is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the plaintiff’s
working environment without regard to the organizational status of the harasser. If it is, then the
court should not underestimate the effect that harassment may have simply because the
harasser(s) is a subordinate. If anything, social science tells us that contra-power harassment is
less welcome and more upsetting behavior than “typical” cases.337
This change will not adversely impact claims of women harassed by supervisors or coworkers. First, my proposal has no impact on quid pro quo claims. A court engages in an
analysis of the “totality of the circumstances” only for a hostile environment claim. An
employee who suffers a loss of a tangible employment benefit at the hands of her supervisor has
a quid pro quo claim. Thus, a quid pro quo claim may only be brought by an employee harassed
by a supervisor. The organizational status of the parties is the heart of the claim. Second, for
claims of a hostile environment created by co-workers, the plaintiff suffers no detriment by
ignoring the organizational status of the actors involved. The only potential detriment lies in
claims for hostile environments created by a supervisor. However, the organizational status of
the parties would have no effect on a finding of pervasiveness. Because courts interpret
pervasiveness as “frequency” – something either is pervasive or it is not. Thus, the only scenario
wherein setting aside the organizational status of the parties would have a potential negative
effect on the plaintiff is in determining the “severity” of the conduct engaged in by a supervisor.
The standard is that the conduct be severe or pervasive; it need not be both. Thus, a plaintiff
should be able to prove that the behavior meets this standard without a discussion of the
organizational status of the parties.
By setting aside the hierarchical relationship of the parties, contra-power claims should
receive greater attention from the courts without negatively impacting other hostile environment
claims. The only place the organizational status of the parties should be considered is in the final
element – employer liability.
V.

Employer Liability

Employer liability, or the lack thereof, is one of the most common reasons for a plaintiff
to lose in her sexual harassment claim.338 Title VII proscribes certain employment practices of
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Id.
336
Id. at 1261.
337
Wayne, supra note 16, at 319.
338
Juliano & Schwab, supra note 178, at 589.
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“employers.”339 As Justice Marshall noted, most employment decisions are carried out by
individuals.340
Anticipating this, Congress included “agents” within the definition of
“employer.”341 Thus, the plaintiff must show some reason why the employer, as an entity,
should be liable for the actions of its agents. The correct standard to hold an employer liable has
been much debated by academics and caused much confusion in the courts.342
This confusion was initially caused by the Supreme Court’s failure to provide definitive
standards in its Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson decision.343 In Meritor, the Court explicitly
“decline[d] the parties’ invitation to issue a definitive rule on employer liability.”344 Noting that
Congress defined employer to include any agent of the employer, the Court concluded that
Congress intended “to place some limits on the acts of employees for which employers under
Title VII are to be held responsible.”345 The Court therefore rejected the Court of Appeals and
the EEOC Guidelines, which held employers absolutely liable for sexual harassment by
supervisors regardless of the notice the employer received.346 For the same reasons, the Court
held that a lack of notice to the employer does not insulate the employer from liability.347 The
Court specifically held that the existence of a grievance procedure and a policy against
discrimination along with the victim’s failure to invoke that procedure does not insulate an
employer from liability.348 Without further explication, the Court stated that agency principles
should apply to determine liability.349
Justice Marshall concurred in the judgment but wrote separately on the question of
employer liability.350 Justice Marshall discussed the EEOC Guidelines, which he believed are
entitled to great deference.351 Under the Guidelines, an employer would be liable for the actions
of its supervisory employees regardless of the notice given to the employer.352 For sexual
339

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006). For a discussion of the unlawful employment practices proscribed by Title VII,
see infra notes 6-14 and accompanying text.
340
Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 75 (Marshall, J, concurring) (“An employer can act only through
individual supervisors and employees; discrimination is rarely carried out pursuant to a formal vote of a
corporation’s board of directors.”).
341
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (b) (2006).
342
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 785 (1998) (“Since our decision in Meritor, Courts of Appeals
have struggled to derive manageable standards to govern employer liability for hostile environment harassment
perpetrated by supervisory employees.”).
343
Meritor, 477 U.S. 57.
344
Id. at 72. The Court also seemed reluctant to issue a definitive employer liability rule based on the fact that the
“debate over the appropriate standard for employer liability has a rather abstract quality about it given the state of
the record in this case.” Id. The Court pointed out that they were presently unsure of whether defendant Taylor had
“made any sexual advances toward respondent at all, let alone whether those advances were unwelcome, whether
they were sufficiently pervasive to constitute a condition of employment,” and finally, if they were so pervasive and
continuous as to imply constructive knowledge on the employer’s part. Id.
345
Id.
346
Id.
347
Id.
348
Id. The Court suggested that the facts before it provided the very reason why the employer may still be liable.
The nondiscrimination policy of the Bank did not address sexual harassment specifically, and the grievance
procedure required employees to complain to their supervisor first. Given that the plaintiff’s supervisor was the
alleged harasser, “it is not altogether surprising that respondent failed to invoke the procedure and report her
grievance to him.” Id. at 73.
349
Id. at 72.
350
Id. at 74 (Marshall, J, concurring).
351
Id.
352
Id.
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harassment perpetrated by co-workers, the employer would be responsible for acts where the
employer “knows or should have known of the conduct, unless it can show that it took
immediate and appropriate corrective action.”353 Justice Marshall rejected the argument that
hostile environment cases require notice to the employer before liability attached whereas cases
with a tangible job detriment to the plaintiff trigger absolute liability.354 “No such requirement
appears in the statute, and no such requirement can coherently be drawn from the law of
agency.”355 Justice Marshall would therefore craft a rule wherein the employer is liable for the
sexual harassment by a supervisor regardless of notice to the employer.
A. Current State of the Law
After twelve years of disagreement amongst the Circuits as to the results of these agency
principles, the Supreme Court issued a pair of cases that clarified the standards for employer
liability in cases involving sexual harassment by a supervisor.356 In Burlington Industries, Inc. v.
Ellerth and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, the Court held that an employer is vicariously liable
for sexual harassment by a supervisor where the harassment results in tangible employment
action.357 For cases without a tangible employment action but rather involving a hostile
environment created by the actions of a supervisor, the employer is vicariously liable but retains
a two-part affirmative defense.358 To avoid liability, the employer must prove “(a) that the
employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing
behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any
preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.”359
The Court based its decisions on agency principles found in the Restatement (Second) of
Agency, the holding of Meritor and the inclusion of damages in the 1991 Civil Rights Act.
Because the definition of “employer” in Title VII includes “agents,” the Court turned to the
353

Id. at 74 (quoting EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R §§ 1604.11(c), (d) (1985)).
Id. at 76-77. Justice Marshall argued that the responsibilities of supervisors “do not begin and end with the
power to hire, fire, and discipline employees,” yet extend to both the “day-to-day supervision of the work
environment and with ensuring a safe, productive workplace.” Id. at 76. Justice Marshall further argued that there
is no justification as to why an “abuse of the latter authority should have different consequences than abuse of the
former,” as in both situations “it is the authority vested in the supervisor by the employer that enables him to commit
the wrong: it is precisely because the supervisor is understood to be clothed with the employer’s authority that he is
able to impose unwelcome sexual conduct on subordinates.” Id. at 76-77.
355
Id. at 77.
356
Burlington Indus, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
357
See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760-61 (citing Meritor, 477 U.S. at 70-71); Faragher, 524 U.S. at 790 (citing Meritor,
477 U.S. at 70-71 for same provision). The continued demarcation between cases with tangible employment actions
(quid pro quo cases) and those without has placed great weight on the definition of “tangible employment action.”
358
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
359
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. The Court in both decisions notes that the affirmative
defense is subject to proof by a preponderance of the evidence. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
“While proof that an employer had promulgated an anti-harassment policy with complaint procedure is not
necessary in every instance as a matter of law, the need for a stated policy suitable to the employment circumstances
may appropriately be addressed in any case when litigating the first element of the defense.” Ellerth, 524 U.S. at
765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. The Court also adds “while proof that an employee failed to fulfill the
corresponding obligation of reasonable care to avoid harm is not limited to showing any unreasonable failure to use
any complaint procedure provided by the employer, a demonstration of such failure will normally suffice to satisfy
the employer’s burden under the second element of the defense.” Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at
807-08. See also Ryan P. Harley, Note, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace – Prompt and Remedial Action as a
Measure of Employer Liability Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 27 WHITTIER L. REV. 533 (2005)
(discussing fact patterns that meet, or fail to meet, affirmative defense).
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Restatement. The Court considered the various methods of imposing liability under the
Restatement section 219.360 The Court rejected imposing liability under a “scope of
employment” test, holding that generally, “sexual harassment by a supervisor is not conduct
within the scope of employment.”361 Rather, the harassing supervisor acts out of personal
motives and/or motives antithetical to the interests of the employer.362
The Court then considered the various methods for imposing liability under section
219(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Agency.363 Section 219(2) describes those instances in
which an employer is liable for acts committed by an employee acting outside of the scope of
employment.364 The section embodies four principles: the employer intended the conduct of the
consequences; the employer was negligent or reckless; the conduct violated a non-delegable duty
of the employer; or the servant purported to speak on behalf of the principal and there was
reliance upon apparent authority, or he was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of
the agency relationship.365 The Court rejected the first (direct and indirect liability) and the third
(non-delegable duty) as irrelevant to the particular case.366
Turning to the question of negligence, the Court found that an employer may be liable for
harassment, although outside of the scope of employment, where the employer’s own negligence
is a cause of the harassment.367 Further, the Court found that negligence is a “minimum standard
of employer liability under Title VII” wherein an employer is liable if it knew or should have
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RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1958) (stating that “master is subject to liability for the torts
of his servants committed while acting in the scope of employment”). See also Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 755-57;
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 793-801. Although the Ellerth decision rejects liability under the “scope of employment”
test, the Court did note that “[t]here are instances, of course, where a supervisor engages in unlawful discrimination
with the purpose, mistaken or otherwise, to serve the employer.” Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 757. The Faragher opinion
contains a longer discussion of the “scope of employment” basis for imposing liability. The Faragher opinion notes
that the cases holding that sexual harassment falls outside of the scope of employment are “in tension” with those
cases outside of the Title VII context where the scope of employment has been defined broadly. Faragher, 524 U.S.
at 794. Some courts have included sexual assaults within the scope of employment. Id. at 795. The Court
considered whether the costs of sexual harassment should be placed on the employer through a broad definition of
scope of employment rather than on the employee. However, the Court found two reasons not to do so:
congressional intent and distinction between co-worker harassment and supervisor harassment. Id. at 798-800.
First, the Court found that there was no evidence that Congress intended courts to ignore the distinction between acts
falling within the scope and actions falling outside the scope. Id. at 798. Because acts of harassment would
generally be defined as outside of the scope of harassment, the Court chose to apply the traditional agency
principles. Id. at 799. Second, the Court noted the lower courts, by employing a negligence standard for co-worker
harassment, have determined harassment to be outside the scope of co-workers’ duties as well. Id. If the scope of
employment reasoning was used to require the employer to bear the costs of harassment for supervisors, the same
logic would apply to co-worker harassment. Id. at 800. Therefore, the Court rejected the scope of employment as a
basis for employer liability for supervisory harassment. Id. at 801.
362
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 757; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 794.
363
See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 758-64. See also Faragher, 524 U.S. at 801-07. In the Faragher opinion, the Court
focused more on a specific evaluation of the use of § 219(2)(d) as a standard for imposing liability on employers as
opposed to a comprehensive examination of all four standards within § 219(2). Id.
364
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2) (1958).
365
Id.
366
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 759. Note, however, that the Court did not exclude the possibility that some supervisors who
harass will be of sufficiently high rank in the company, making him or her the employer’s alter ego. Id. As such,
the employer will be indirectly liable for the harassment. Id.
367
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 758-59.
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known about the conduct and failed to stop it.368 However, the Court went on to consider
whether a stricter standard should apply.
The last possibility under section 219(2) involves vicarious liability for intentional torts
committed when the employee uses apparent authority or when the employee “‘was aided in
accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation.’”369 The Ellerth Court quickly
rejected the apparent authority theory because “a supervisor’s harassment involves the misuse of
actual power, not the false impression of its existence.”370 Thus, the Court grounded its decision
in the “aided in the agency relation” rule.
The Court noted that all torts in the workplace are aided by the existence of the agency
relationship because the relationship allows for proximity and contact with potential victims.371
However, if liability depended solely on this formulation, then the employer would be liable for
all harassment committed by supervisors and co-workers.372 Therefore, the Court held that there
must be something more than the employment relation itself to impose vicarious liability.373 It
found that “something more” in those cases where the supervisor takes a tangible employment
action.374 Where there is a tangible employment action, there is a direct economic injury and an
official act of the company, often reviewed by higher-level supervisors.375 This injury could not
have been inflicted in the absence of the agency relation and only a supervisor can cause this sort
of injury.376 Therefore, in regard to the requirements of the aided in the agency standard, the
Court held, “its requirements will always be met when a supervisor takes a tangible employment
action against a subordinate. In that instance, it would be implausible to interpret agency
principles to allow an employer to escape liability . . . .”377
Turning to those cases where there is no tangible employment action, the Court found the
aided in the agency relationship more difficult to apply. A supervisor’s harassing conduct is that
much more menacing due to the supervisor’s power and authority.378 In that way, a supervisor is
always aided in the agency relationship.379 However, some acts of harassment by a supervisor
could be the same acts as those of a co-employee.380 The Court referred to this aspect of the
368

Id. at 759.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 759 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2) (1958)). See also Faragher, 524
U.S. at 801 (quoting same provision).
370
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 759. The Court held that in the unusual case of a false impression that the actor was indeed a
supervisor, the victim’s mistake must be a reasonable one. Id.
371
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760. “In a sense, most workplace tortfeasors are aided in accomplishing their tortious
objective by the existence of the agency relation: Proximity and regular contact may afford a captive pool of
potential victims.” Id.
372
Id. (noting that this is “result enforced by neither the EEOC nor any court of appeals to have considered the
issue”).
373
Id.
374
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760. The Court defined tangible employment action as a “significant change in employment
status, such as hiring, firing, failure to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a
decision causing a significant change in benefits.” Id. at 761.
375
Id. at 762.
376
See id. (explaining further that employment actions that are tangible “fall within the special province of the
supervisor,” as supervisors are empowered by their companies as “distinct class of agent[s] to make economic
decisions affecting other employees” under their control).
377
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762-63.
378
Id. at 763; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 803 (noting that “victim may well be reluctant to accept the risks of blowing the
whistle on a superior”).
379
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 763; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 802.
380
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 763.
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aided in the agency relationship as a “developing feature of agency law” and “hesitate[d] to
render a definitive explanation of our understanding of the standard . . . .”381 The Faragher
Court approved in a general manner of the imposition of vicarious liability for misuse of
supervisory authority. However, the Court noted that it must “square” this principle with the
decision in Meritor that an employer is not automatically liable.382 Further, Congress had not
altered the Meritor rule, but rather made significant changes to Title VII while cognizant of
Meritor’s precedent.383 The Faragher Court determined that there were two possibilities to
reconcile these two principles.384 Under the first possibility, the plaintiff would need to show
proof that the harassing supervisor engaged in some sort of affirmative invocation of supervisory
authority.385 The Court rejected this approach as too difficult to determine, not practical and
litigation-producing.386 The second alternative, and the one the Court adopted, is the creation of
the two-part affirmative defense.387 Both the Faragher and Ellerth decisions summoned the
goals of Title VII in support of the affirmative defense for employers. Title VII is intended to
avoid harm through the creation of anti-harassment policies and effective grievance
procedures.388 Further, limiting employer liability could “encourage employees to report
harassing conduct before it becomes severe or pervasive,” which would serve Title VII’s
deterrent purpose.389 The Court limited this holding to cases involving “an actionable hostile
environment created by a supervisor with immediate (or successively higher) authority over the
employee.”390
Although superficially resolving the debate about employer liability, the
Faragher/Ellerth standard has earned its fair share of criticism.391 Joanna Grossman, an astute
critic of employer liability standards, refers to these cases as a “victory for the misguided culture
of compliance.”392 Employers, according to Grossman, may insulate themselves from liability
381

Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 763. For a more expansive reading of the aided in the agency standard, see Carle, supra note
27a, at 91 (arguing that some co-workers possess informal power vested in them by employers to alter the terms and
conditions of employment).
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Faragher, 524 U.S. at 804. See also Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 763 (explaining that they are “bound by our holding in
Meritor that agency principles constrain the imposition of vicarious liability in cases of supervisory harassment”).
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Faragher, 524 U.S. at 804 n.4; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 763-64.
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Faragher, 524 U.S. at 804.
385
Id.
386
Id. at 804-05.
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Id. at 805.
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Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806.
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Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764.
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Id. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. Justice Thomas, with Justice Scalia joining, dissented. See Ellerth, 524
U.S. at 766-74 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Faragher, 534 U.S. at 810-11 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas
described the standards for employer liability for racial hostile environment cases as solely that of negligence.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 768. He argued that the standards for racial hostile environments and hostile environments
based on sex should be the same and that the standard should be a negligence standard. Id. at 769-71. He criticized
the majority’s holding as lacking support from agency principles and as violating the premise of Meritor that
employers are not automatically liable. Id. at 771-74.
391
One student note suggested that the decisions would make the grant of summary judgment for employers a more
difficult decision because the standards are so fact intensive. See Tara Kaesbier, Note, Employer Liability in
Supervisor Sexual Harassment Cases: The Supreme Court Finally Speaks, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 203, 223-24 (1999).
Cf. Carle, supra note 27a, at 93-94 (informal survey shows plaintiffs are losing sexual harassment cases at the
summary judgment stage based on the assertion of the affirmative defense).
392
Joanna L. Grossman, The Culture of Compliance: The Final Triumph of Form Over Substance in Sexual
Harassment Law, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 3 (2003) (arguing through article for abolition of affirmative defense,
increase in availability of punitive damages, and creation of individual supervisory liability for harassment). See
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without making a dent in the prevalence of sexual harassment.393 Another commentator has
argued that the liability standards have caused employers to discharge those accused of sexual
harassment, leading to a “paradox” of liability for employers.393a
B. The Negligence Standard
Although the Faragher and Ellerth decisions did not explicitly set forth a standard for coworker harassment, the Supreme Court did describe negligence as the “minimum” standard
under Title VII.394 Most lower courts, pre- and post-Faragher/Ellerth, apply a negligence
standard to co-worker harassment cases.395 In its most basic formulation, an employer may be
held liable for harassment by a co-worker based on its own negligence when the employer either
knew or should have known about the harassment and failed to stop it.396 This test examines the
same workplace factors as the affirmative defense developed in Ellerth and Faragher.397
However, under the negligence standard, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove these elements
rather than on the employer.397a
The lower courts have stated the test as whether the employer had either actual or
constructive notice of the harassment and whether the employer failed to take prompt remedial
action.398 In addition, in some jurisdictions, a plaintiff may show that the employer provided no
reasonable avenue for complaint.399 Actual notice does not require the plaintiff to follow the
reporting procedures as long as a high-level management official or someone with the power to

also Grossman, supra note 15, at 719-35 (criticizing Supreme Court and lower courts’ interpretation of Title VII as
too lenient with regard to employer liability).
393
Grossman, supra note 392, at 3.
393a
Estelle D. Franklin, Maneuvering Through the Lebyrinth: The Employers’ Paradox in Responding to Hostile
Environment Sexual Harassment – A Proposed Way Out, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 1517 (March 1999). Franklin
proposes a set system of offenses and punishments in order to put employees on notice. She advocates a dual
responsibility approach under which all supervisory personnel have the duty to report complaints and all potentially
harassing conduct. All employees must report all potentially harassing conduct or be foreclosed from later raising a
complaint. Id. at 1524. Franklin balances her requirement of complete reporting with the requirement on the
employer that all complaints are taken seriously and the consequences are known. Id. at 1593.
394
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 759.
395
See infra notes 398-410 and accompanying text. See also Faragher, 524 U.S. at 799. As part of its argument
concerning why sexual harassment should not be considered within the scope of employment, the court states that
the district courts and courts of appeals thus far have uniformly judged “employer liability for co-worker harassment
under a negligence standard.” Id.
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Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 759.
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Id. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. The EEOC regulations hold an employer responsible for co-worker
harassment in the workplace where “the employer (or its agents or supervisory employees) knows or should have
known of the conduct, unless it can show that it took immediate and appropriate corrective action.” 29 C.F.R. §
1604.11(d).
397a
See, e.g., Swinton v. Potomac, 270 F.3d 794, 804 (9th Cir. 2001) (same facts relevant to negligence and
vicarious liability claims although the party bearing the burden of proof differs); Wilson v. Tulsa J.C., 164 F.3d 534,
541 (10th Cir. 1998) (same).
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See, e.g., Williams v. ConAgra Poultry Co., 378 F.3d 790, 794-95 (8th Cir. 2004); McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp.,
360 F.3d 1103, 1119 (9th Cir. 2004); Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan, Inc., 277 F.3d 1269, 1280 (11th Cir. 2002);
Berry v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 260 F.3d 803, 811 (7th Cir. 2001); Mikels v. City of Durham, 183 F.3d 323, 332 (4th
Cir. 1999); Moore v. KUKA Welding Sys., 171 F.3d 1073, 1079 (6th Cir. 1999); Jeffries v. Kansas, 147 F.3d 1220,
1229 (10th Cir. 1998).
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See, e.g., Feingold v. N.Y., 366 F.3d 138, 152 (2d Cir. 2004); Susko v. Romano’s Macaroni Grill, 142 F. Supp.
2d 333, 338 (E.D.N.Y. 2001); Badlam v. Reynolds Metals Co., 46 F. Supp. 2d 187, 197 (N.D.N.Y. 1999).
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remedy the problem has actual notice of the harassment.400 In some cases, courts have found
notice to the employer when the notice came from someone other than the target of the
harassment.400a However, if the employee does follow the terms of the policy, then the
employer’s notice is established.401 Courts have found constructive notice of the harassment
where high-level management officials should have gained knowledge of the harassment had
they acted with reasonable care,402 or when the harassment was so open and pervasive that a
reasonable employer would have been aware of it.403 For an employer to be charged with
constructive knowledge, the harassment must be greater than that required for an actionable
hostile environment claim. That is, it must be more than severe or pervasive; it must equate to a
“campaign” of harassment.404
As for the prompt remedial action prong, the employer’s response, in general, must
simply be reasonable.405 Courts decline to find negligence on the employer’s part when the
employer implements remedial measures unless the remedial measures exhibit a high level of
indifference as to the amount to discrimination.406 The reasonableness of the remedial measures
depends on the ability to stop the current harassment, to deter future harassers, the alternatives
available to the employer, and the amount of time that elapsed between the notice and the
initiation of remedial measures.407 Thus, courts have found the employer not liable when the
employer takes prompt action in response to the complaint, gives a strong warning to the
harassers,408 transfers or suspends the harasser,409 and/or implements training for the entire
department.410
With these two standards in mind, I turn now to the contra-power cases.
C. Employer Liability in Contra-power Cases
400

See Cerros v. Steel Techs., Inc., 398 F.3d 944, 952-53 (7th Cir. 2005); Wanchik v. Great Lakes Health Plan, Inc.,
6 F. App’x 252, 264 (6th Cir 2001); Sharp v. City of Houston, 164 F.3d 923, 929-30 (5th Cir. 1999). Often there is
a question as to whether a particular official who received notice of the harassment is of sufficient rank so that the
notice may be imputed to the employer. For a discussion of the tests employed by the courts, see Stanford Edward
Purser, Note: Young v. Bayer Corp.: When is Notice of Sexual Harassment to an Employee Notice to the Employer?,
1998 B.Y.U. L. REV. 909 (1998) (arguing that courts should adopt a test for notice which considers who within the
company plaintiff reasonably believed had the power to respond to sexual harassment).
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See Hockman v. Westward Commc’ns, LLC, 407 F.3d 317, 329 (5th Cir. 2004); Mandy v. Quad/Graphics, Inc.,
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1008, 1034 (S.D. Iowa 2004).
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Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d 991, 1000 (N.D. Iowa 1999).
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Lowe v. Unifi, Inc., 292 F. Supp. 2d 773, 784 (M.D.N.C. 2003).
410
See, e.g., Robinson v. Valmont Indus., 238 F.3d 1045, 1047 (8th Cir. 2001); Wieland v. Dep’t of Transp., 98 F.
Supp. 2d 1010, 1023 (N.D. Ind. 2000).
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Of the twenty-four contra-power cases, fourteen mention a standard for employer
liability, if only in passing, and each uses the negligence-based test.411 Only two cases engage in
any discussion about the rationale behind using the co-worker standard for a subordinate-created
hostile environment.412 The rest mention the negligence standard without any elaboration as to
why it is the appropriate standard.413 No court has explicitly adopted a separate standard for
contra-power harassment.
In Cronin v. United Serv. Stations, Inc., the court discussed the negligence standard as
appropriate in those cases in which the harasser is not the plaintiff’s “‘employer’ or ‘agent.’”414
As examples, the court mentioned co-workers or supervisors with no authority over the
plaintiff.415 That, however, is the extent of the discussion. Mingo v. Roadway Express, Inc.
contains the most in-depth discussion as to which standard of employer liability should apply.416
There, the court begins by noting that the employer’s liability depends on the status of the
harasser and defines the alternatives as either a supervisor or a co-worker.417 After describing
the negligence standard, the court observed that “most of the harassers were not supervisors but
were low-level dock workers. In fact, some of the men who [plaintiff] claims harassed her were
supervised by [plaintiff] herself.”418 The court then deemed the plaintiff’s status as a supervisor
irrelevant, and that the relevant issue was the employer’s knowledge of and response to the
harassment.419 With a bit of a leap in the analysis, the court then held that because the alleged
harassers were of equal or lesser rank than the plaintiff, the co-employee standard was the
comparable and appropriate standard.420
411
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A third contra-power case does not discuss the appropriate standard for employer liability
but contains an interesting discussion of the plaintiff’s actual authority over the harasser.421 In
Lewis v. Sugar Creek Stores, Inc., the employer argued that the because the plaintiff was the
store manager, she was responsible to “detect, stop, and report any sexual harassment taking
place” and that any hostile environment which she suffered was of her own making by her failure
to discipline the harasser.422 After first recognizing the viability of a contra-power claim,423 the
court discussed the reality of the plaintiff’s power over the harasser. The defendants argued that
the plaintiff was authorized to take any necessary action, including termination, against the
harasser.424 The plaintiff responded by stating that she did not have the authority to terminate the
harasser, that her supervisor told her she could not fire or hire without his express permission,
that she reported the conduct to her supervisor, that he failed to take any action, and that the
employer failed to provide any training as to how to respond to harassment.425 The court held
that this discrepancy in the facts precluded summary judgment for the employer. “[A] jury will
have to determine whether [plaintiff] had the ability to stop [the] harassment and if so, whether
she should be held partly or wholly responsible” for damages she suffered.426 The court could
not have employed the negligence standard because it did not discuss the question of notice to
the employer or the employer’s response. Thus, the Lewis court appears to have created a
standard for contra-power cases wherein the plaintiff will not be able to recover against the
employer if she failed to exercise any authority she had over the harasser. Importantly, the court
does not accept the employer’s assertion that simply because her job title indicates that the
plaintiff was the supervisor, she could fire the harasser. However, as mentioned above, the court
does not explain why these facts matter in a determination of employer liability.
Other courts, although not as explicitly as the Lewis court, also discussed whether the
target of the harassment attempted any discipline against the harasser. The court in Perkins v.
General Motors Corp. noted that the plaintiff “exercised her authority as a supervisor and had
[the harasser] sent to labor relations for a disciplinary interview . . . . Perkins knew how to use
the available disciplinary procedures and had the supervisory power to stop the conduct and
punish the offender.”427 The court found for the employer.428 Similarly, in Mingo, the court
noted that the plaintiff never reprimanded, counseled or disciplined her subordinates.429 Finally
and somewhat ironically, in Wilson v. University of Texas Health Center, the court noted that the
plaintiff took no action against her subordinates allegedly engaged in harassment.430 Rather, she
received a reprimand herself for failing in her duty as police officer to report the harassment
immediately and for failing to take supervisory action.431 Despite discussing the supervisor-
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target’s power to discipline the harassers, the courts never explain the relevance of such power
for an analysis of employer liability.
Most of the remaining cases gloss over the contra-power nature of the facts. Of the
eleven cases that even touch upon the question of employer liability, five found for the plaintiff
on the issue432 and another made statements in the plaintiff’s favor (although ultimately finding
against her).433 One case reached judgment in favor of the plaintiff where the employer had
actual notice “but laughed about it and was utterly unresponsive in remedying the situation.”434
The court found actual notice where the plaintiff told the general manager of the store about the
harassment and gave him notes she had kept about the harassment.435 In four of these cases, the
court denied summary judgment for the employer on the question of employer liability. As
discussed above in Lewis, the court determined there was a question as to whether the plaintiff
had the authority to discipline the harasser and therefore denied summary judgment.436 In
Cleveland v. International Paper Co., the court found that there was an issue of fact as to
whether the defendant knew or should have known about the harassing conduct.437 Although the
plaintiff did not make a formal complaint of harassment until months after it began, she stated
that she informally told the human resources manager about the conduct.438 The court found that
this evidence created enough of an issue of fact as to whether the defendant had notice of the
harassment, particularly because the “human resources office normally is the appropriate avenue
for discrimination complaints.”439 Similarly, in Humphreys v. Medical Towers, Ltd., the court
denied summary judgment for the employer because of a dispute as to whether the employer
responded to notice of the sexual harassment with prompt remedial action.440 The employer
argued that he reprimanded the harasser and sent both parties to counseling. After noting that
Humphreys could show actual notice on the part of the employer, the court reconsidered her
version of the events.441 According to Humphreys, her supervisor dismissed her complaints,
criticized her for overreacting, and tried to excuse the behavior by stating that the harasser “could
not work for and would not take orders from a woman.”442 Therefore, the court denied summary
judgment.
In Mingo, the employer also lost its motion for summary judgment.443 In that case, the
employer had a written policy for filing sexual harassment complaints which Mingo, the
plaintiff, did not follow.444 However, both the employer and Mingo stated that there was an
unwritten policy wherein complaints could be reported to certain supervisory staff, although they
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disagreed as to which supervisors could receive such complaints.445 Mingo reported her
complaints to her immediate supervisor.446 The court therefore found that there was an issue of
fact as to whether Mingo followed the unwritten policy of the employer.447 Further, the court
found that a jury could find that Mingo was reasonable in bringing her complaints to her
supervisor who could be expected to report them to the appropriate persons.448 Finally, in Ott v.
Perk Development Corp., the plaintiff raised a sufficient factual issue on the question of
employer liability.449 She testified that she reported the alleged harassment to her supervisor and
that her complaint was not taken seriously, that her supervisor laughed at her and that the
harasser was merely verbally reprimanded.450
In the remaining cases which discuss the employer liability prong of the claim, courts
found that the employer had adequately responded to the complaints of harassment by
investigating the complaints,451 disciplining the harasser and threatening the harasser with
termination if the behavior persisted,452 instructing the harasser to have no further contact with
the target,453 and forcing the harasser into early retirement.454 In Perkins, the court found that
when the plaintiff did complain about harassing incidents, “appropriate corrective actions were
taken either by plaintiff individually or in her capacity as a supervisor or by management or
union officials.”455 In two of the cases, the courts found lack of notice to the employer. In
Kirkland v. Brinias, the court noted that the “evidence that the defendant employers recognized,
or should have recognized, that any of the employees found [the harasser’s] conduct sexually
offensive, did not preponderate in favor of the plaintiffs.”456
Thus, the contra-power cases either do not discuss the employer liability standard or
apply the negligence standard. In applying the negligence standard, some courts hint that the
failure of the supervisor-target to exercise any discipline against the harassers undercut her claim
in some undescribed or unanalyzed manner. The rest of the courts do not give any special
445
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analytical value to the contra-power nature of the facts. The question then is whether they
should.
D. Proposal
Although I agree with much of the criticism of the current employer liability standards, I
do not argue here for a change in the standards. Adopting the “actual state of things”
perspective,457 the two alternatives for employer liability are the Faragher/Ellerth “aided in the
agency relation” standard with accompanying affirmative defense, and the negligence standard.
The agency principles rejected by the Supreme Court for holding employers liable for
supervisory harassment are equally inapplicable to contra-power harassment. As described
above, the courts have rejected the scope of employment test, finding harassment to be generally
outside the scope of employment.458 The options from Restatement section 219(2) are equally
irrelevant to contra-power harassment.459 In general, there is no non-delegable duty involved, no
direct liability (the harasser here is not high enough in the organizational hierarchy to be
considered an “agent” of the employer), and certainly no question of apparent authority in
contra-power situations.460 This leaves the aided in the agency standard and the negligence
standard. Under the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Faragher/Ellerth, the aided in the agency
relationship does not apply.461 The subordinate is not an agent of the employer. Therefore,
under the current options, employers could be liable under the negligence standard for contrapower harassment.462
How then should the negligence standard work in a contra-power case? Does the
standard need to change? More specifically, should courts adopt the approach of the court in
Lewis v. Sugar Creek Stores, Inc., and the like: that is, examining the target’s authority to take
action and discipline the harasser prior to determining the employer’s liability and, presumably,
finding no liability where the supervisor does not exercise her authority?463
There is a compelling argument that the supervisor-target of the harassment should be
required to exercise any power she may have to discipline the harasser, and that if she does not
do so, the employer cannot be held liable. Why should the employer be liable when a
management official is unwilling to exercise that authority given to her? There is some appeal to
this argument from the perspective of supporting women’s agency. The law should not assume
that women with power cannot exercise that power simply because they are women. The law
should not assume that women at work need to be rescued.
However, requiring female supervisors to take preemptive action excuses an employer
from preventing, or even paying attention to, the sexual harassment of an entire class of its
workers. Such a standard would absolve employers from maintaining a discrimination-free
457
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workplace. Requiring supervisors who are targets of harassment to take action preemptively
ignores the realities of how women respond to sexual harassment.464 In fact, the most common
responses to sexual harassment are avoidance and appeasement (including the use of humor in
less serious situations).465 The most infrequent response is to seek institutional support, e.g.,
telling a supervisor, bringing a formal complaint, or filing a suit.466 For contra-power
harassment, the evidence as to reporting is mixed. Some suggest that victims are more likely to
report supervisor harassment over co-worker harassment.467 This suggests that targets of sexual
harassment would report contra-power harassment the least. However, one study reported that
contra-power harassment situations were more easily resisted and had better outcomes; when the
targets were in organizational positions that afforded direct power over the harasser’s
employment status, there were better opportunities for the target to resolve the situation.468 As a
result, there were fewer impediments to reporting contra-power harassment.469 Yet, simply
because women have achieved a certain place in the management hierarchy does not mean that
they possess actual power to stop the harassment. As the same study noted, “even if women
succeed in attaining formal organizational power, they often have less access to informal power,
derived from access to resources, alliances and informal political influence, which is necessary to
exercise the power associated with their formal position.”470 In fact, a separate study found that
contra-power complaints were often dismissed by management.471 In discussing how
management engages in the construction and interpretation of sexual harassment, this study
found that some supervisors created an exemption from the sexual harassment policies for samesex, contra-power harassment.472 In the particular situation discussed, the supervisors were
reluctant to intervene because the person who engaged in the questionable conduct was female,
the lowest-level staffer in the office, and her behavior was considered not very intrusive.473 In
this way, supervisors and management create obstacles to reporting contra-power harassment.
In light of this overwhelming evidence, a supervisor who is a target of contra-power
harassment should not be required to discipline or otherwise take action against the harasser in
order to have a viable claim. Rather, the negligence standard should be used. I believe that the
negligence standard can be employed in a manner which does not undercut women’s agency, and
does not place women in a “help me, I’m a girl” role. Reporting the harassment to supervisors or
designated human resources persons should count as taking action. Given the obstacles to
reporting sexual harassment, notifying the employer is, in fact, an exercise of personal power
which should be supported and encouraged.474
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How then should the negligence standard be employed in a contra-power case? There are
two parts to the standard: notice and prompt remedial action.
1. Notice
As discussed above, there are two ways by which the employer can receive notice of the
conduct: actual notice and constructive notice. In fourteen of the contra-power cases, the courts
mentioned that the targets of the harassment reported the harassment to someone within the
organization.475 In five of these cases, there was an issue as to whether the target reported to the
correct official, or the target filed an informal, verbal complaint as opposed to a formal
complaint.476 The courts should continue to find that the employer has actual notice even if the
target of the harassment reports to someone outside of the official sexual harassment policy. If a
supervisor reports the harassment to someone who can reasonably be expected to report the
harassment to the proper official, then the employer should be deemed to have actual notice of
the harassment. In this way, employers will be encouraged to adopt policies that encourage
targets of harassment to report.477 Actual notice to the employer then triggers the duty to take
prompt remedial action.477a
As for constructive knowledge, the harassment of a supervisor may be more open and
notorious than that of a line worker, so much so that a mindful employer could not help but
become aware of the harassment. In some cases, the supervisor will take pains to hide the fact
she is being harassed so that her ability to manage is not called into question. Courts should be
equally willing to find constructive knowledge in contra-power cases as in other harassment
cases.
2. Prompt Remedial Action
As one of the goals of Title VII is to deter future harassment, the system should provide
incentives to employers to actually end the harassment. Thus, employers who explicitly
authorize the target of the harassment to take action against the harasser should be found
ordinarily to have met their obligations under Title VII.478 I say “ordinarily” because in
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particular circumstances, such action may not adequately respond to the harassment. As the
Supreme Court of West Virginia discussed in a contra-power case:
[I]f a supervisor complains to her employer of a subordinate’s
harassment and the employer responds, “You take care of it,” that
may in some cases be sufficient – if the supervisor has full
disciplinary authority and circumstances permit use of it. In other
cases, however, that response may be inadequate. The harassed
supervisor could be the object of an entire crew of male harassers
and would likely need greater assistance from her employer than a
flippant, “You handle it.”478a
Encouraging employers to empower female supervisors will respect women’s choices and
support the ability of women to choose the role they wish to inhabit at work. It will also provide
an incentive to employers to take action that will end the harassment as opposed to simply taking
“reasonable steps.”479 For example, in DeAngelis v. El Paso Municipal Police Officers Ass’n
and Ott v. Perk Development Corp., the target of the harassment took action in some form
against the harasser.480 In both cases, the employer supported the exercise of power by the
plaintiffs481 and in both cases, the court found the employers not to be liable.482
Similarly, if an employer undercuts or reverses a supervisor’s discipline against a
harasser, there should be a presumption that the employer failed to take prompt remedial action.
In Johnson v. Professional Services Group, Inc., the plaintiff reprimanded a subordinate for
reading a sexually explicit magazine on the job.483 She was told not to take any action against
any further employees.484 Assuming the remaining elements of the claim are met, the employer
should be liable in such a situation.
However, if a supervisor-target reports the harassment and is told by the employer to take
action but fails to do so, then employer should not be liable. The employer, on notice of the
harassment, has chosen to respond to the harassment by delegating the authority to the target of
the harassment. She has been given the explicit authority to discipline the harasser. If she fails
to act because she is uncomfortable exercising organizational power, the employer should not be
liable. Female supervisors should not be excused in such situations from taking action simply
because they are women. This would build a “women as victims” mentality into Title VII.
Giving the female supervisor the explicit power to discipline the harasser may not stop the
harassment, in which case the employer must take other reasonable measures. By reporting the
harassment and receiving explicit authorization to discipline, the supervisor unequivocally
establishes her power and authority to do so. In addition, courts must carefully consider if the
employer has unnecessarily set up the supervisor for retaliation or ostracism by her subordinates.
I realize that this explicit authorization standard does not overcome the problem of
reluctance to report as an initial matter. Employers must provide an environment that allows
478a
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targets to express “resistance through both formal and informal channels.”485 The courts should
remain open to showings that the employer had constructive notice and, therefore, an obligation
to end the harassment.
In applying the negligence standard, courts should not require the supervisor-target to
exercise discipline preemptively. Other targets of sexual harassment are not required to engage
in self-help remedies. In other cases of sexual harassment, a complaint of sexual harassment
puts the employer on notice. There is no compelling reason to create a different rule here.
Supervisors should be penalized for failing to exercise power only when the employer explicitly
authorizes the exercise of such power. Discipline of a tangible nature against a subordinate
harasser is enough of an official act to put the employer on notice of the sexual harassment.
Failure to take prompt remedial action, specifically in the form of undermining the supervisor’s
authority to discipline, should lead to liability.
Conclusion
Among the many factors that drive women from the workplace, being harassed as a
manager is within the grasp of the employer to remedy. Creating a professional atmosphere and
promoting more female managers and supervisors should help to diminish sexual harassment.
The harassment of female managers is not an insubstantial problem. Courts and employers have
discounted contra-power harassment because of its contra-power nature. Instead, courts should
accept contra-power claims and approach such claims as they would other sexual harassment
claims. The status of the target of the harassment should be irrelevant to whether a claim exists,
how the harassment is perceived, and how the harassment affects the target’s working
conditions. Further, courts should not require supervisors to preemptively discipline harassers in
order to have a claim. To do so would place a greater burden on those targeted than on
employers to resolve the epidemic of harassment. If a supervisor reports that she is being
harassed, then under the negligence standard the employer has an obligation to remedy the
problem. Employers should not be excused from this obligation simply because the target has
organizational power. Women who struggle against the odds still present in the workplace to
reach positions of formal power should be protected by the law and by employers.
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